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March 3, 2009

CREDIT WHERE IT'S DUE.

Marc Ambinder asks:

President Obama very appropriately and correctly thanked U.S. Marines for precipitating the turnabout in Iraq. But if there is a chance of success in Iraq now as defined by Barack Obama, shouldn't there be some mention of the change in strategy, and the former Commander in Chief, the guy who hung in there?

I think the term "success" is doing a lot of work here. Barack Obama sees the chance for success in the mission defined by President Bush. But that's like a good price on a house you didn't need and can't afford. Iraq might happily avoid the cataclysmic failure foreseen in 2005, but we're still looking at an unstable Islamic republic that's closely aligned with Iran and continually on the brink of outright civil war. Success relative to the situation in 2005 is not success relative to the hopes in 2003 or the alternate world in which the trillions of dollars spent on Iraq were directed instead to other priorities.

February 27, 2009

OBAMA ANNOUNCES HIS IRAQ PLAN.

As often happens on these matters, I turn to Spencer Ackerman for analysis:

August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end. The combat mission will give way to a training and advisory mission in support of the Iraqi security forces, along with "targeted counter-terrorism missions," but that mission isn't unconditional. Obama said the U.S. military will support its Iraqi counterparts "as long as they remain non-sectarian" -- a subtle shift, but one that places pressure on the Iraqis not to allow their military as a means to a renewed sectarian struggle. What Obama elided is that U.S. soldiers who train Iraqi security forces frequently do so by participating in combat operations. The combat "mission" may end in August 2010, but the presence of U.S. troops in combat won't. Between 30,000 and 55,000 troops will remain in Iraq for these hybrid training/combat missions.

But full withdrawal will follow within 18 months of the combat-brigades' departure. For the first time as president, Obama attempted to resolve ambiguities about a full withdrawal along the Dec. 2011 framework that the Iraqi government insisted upon in last year's Status of Forces Agreement, committing himself to its mechanisms. Some on the left have wondered warily why Obama hadn't made such a public commitment. Those worries will probably end with this line:

"Under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. We will complete this transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home with the honor that they have earned."


One question: Doesn't it seem unlikely that a sectarian turn would hasten our departure? If it began to look like the Iraqi army would abet ethnic violence, would Obama pull out the troops and leave them to it? I'm not saying whether he should or shouldn't -- depend on the circumstances and prospects for peace, I guess -- I'm just asking.

Anyway, full remarks of our commander-in-chief after the fold.

Continue reading "OBAMA ANNOUNCES HIS IRAQ PLAN." »

January 19, 2009

WHAT BUSH DID RIGHT ON IRAQ.

Marc Lynch has a nice argument pushing back on the conventional wisdom that Bush's finest moment in Iraq was the surge. "Perhaps we could have another round of arguments as to whether the surge brigades arriving in the spring of 2007 caused the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda in the fall of 2006?" he asks. But he's willing to give a bit of post-partisan ground. Bush did have a genuinely admirable turn in his Iraq policy. But it wasn't the surge. It was the Status of Forces Agreement.

"Signing a Status of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part," says Lynch. "It demonstrated a pragmatism and willingness to put the national interest ahead of partisanship that few of us believed he possessed. It is largely thanks to Bush's acceptance of his own bargaining failure that Barack Obama will inherit a plausible route to successful disengagement from Iraq."

December 16, 2008

HOW WE KILLED ZARQAWI.

Reuel Marc Gerecht still thinks life is an episode of 24. "If you had been confronted on 7 September 2001 with a captured Khalid Shaykh Muhammad or Abu Zubaydah," he says in response to Andrew Sullivan, "and you knew that a major, mass-casualty terrorist strike was about to go down in the United States, and you had plenipotentiary authority for the nation's security, you would not have used any physically coercive techniques against the gentleman." Forget the question of torture. Gerecht has managed to answer the question in the form of an accusation of deadly cowardice.

But we weren't confronted with that situation on September 7th and, so far as we know, have not been confronted with it since. The appropriate analogy is to imagine yourself an Army recruit who becomes an interrogator in Iraq. A group of young men are captured in a nighttime raid. Some of them might be terrorist sympathizers. Some of them might be innocent. Do you use physically coercive techniques?

In general, we did. Matthew Alexander is the pseudonym for a special operations officer that led the interrogations task force that eventually located, and killed, the terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He oversaw more than 1,000 interrogations and personally conducted more than 300. He writes:

Torture and abuse cost American lives. I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. Our policy of torture was directly and swiftly recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda in Iraq. The large majority of suicide bombings in Iraq are still carried out by these foreigners. They are also involved in most of the attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. It's no exaggeration to say that at least half of our losses and casualties in that country have come at the hands of foreigners who joined the fray because of our program of detainee abuse. The number of U.S. soldiers who have died because of our torture policy will never be definitively known, but it is fair to say that it is close to the number of lives lost on Sept. 11, 2001. How anyone can say that torture keeps Americans safe is beyond me -- unless you don't count American soldiers as Americans.

Now go back to Gerecht's example, because Alexander faced something near to it. You are an interrogator charged with finding the deadliest terrorist in one of the most violent and combustible slices of the globe. You are repeatedly faced with prisoners who know his location, and refuse to divulge it. Finding Zarqawi will save American lives. What do you do?

The Army was still conducting interrogations according to the Guantanamo Bay model: Interrogators were nominally using the methods outlined in the U.S. Army Field Manual, the interrogators' bible, but they were pushing in every way possible to bend the rules -- and often break them...I refused to participate in such practices, and a month later, I extended that prohibition to the team of interrogators I was assigned to lead. I taught the members of my unit a new methodology -- one based on building rapport with suspects, showing cultural understanding and using good old-fashioned brainpower to tease out information. I personally conducted more than 300 interrogations, and I supervised more than 1,000.

The methods my team used are not classified (they're listed in the unclassified Field Manual), but the way we used them was, I like to think, unique. We got to know our enemies, we learned to negotiate with them, and we adapted criminal investigative techniques to our work (something that the Field Manual permits, under the concept of "ruses and trickery"). It worked. Our efforts started a chain of successes that ultimately led to Zarqawi....Our new interrogation methods led to one of the war's biggest breakthroughs: We convinced one of Zarqawi's associates to give up the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader's location. On June 8, 2006, U.S. warplanes dropped two 500-pound bombs on a house where Zarqawi was meeting with other insurgent leaders.

There's something intuitive about torture. Hurt something until it breaks. The phrasing of the the 24 scenario plays implicitly on that intuition: Do you do the thing that works and saves lives? Or do you let abstract principle ensure the deaths of thousands? Framed thus, it's an easy argument to win. When applied to policy, though, it directly ensures the deaths of thousands and fails to capture the worst of the terrorists. God's sense of humor is dark indeed.

November 21, 2008

VICTORY?

Dana Perino says that the real meaning of the U.S-Iraq security agreement is "that the conditions are such now that we are able to celebrate the victory that we’ve had so far." That's some downright Palin-esque sentence construction, but cool! Victory so far! That's good enough for me. Ilan Goldenberg, however, isn't convinced:

It's an interesting definition of "victory." I guess you can define victory as more than 4,000 American fatalities, more than 30,000 wounded, probably hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths, millions of Iraqis displaced, $1-$3 trillion in costs to the U.S. economy, an empowered Iran, an unaddressed threat in Afghanistan, and massive damage to America's image around the world. All for a war that did not actually achieve its original objectives - eliminate a WMD threat that wasn't there, eliminate a terrorism threat that wasn't there, and spread democracy throughout the Middle East. I guess we can define "victory" that way. Probably wouldn't be my definition though.
Peter Galbraith also had an important and insightful essay on our "strange victory." This isn't, it should be said, partisan churlishness. I wrongly, stupidly, supported the Iraq War. I will be very grateful if Iraq in 2009 is better than Iraq in 2005. Fragile stability is better than murderous chaos. But it is not victory. And since future policy decisions are made on the basis of past policy conclusions, it's important to be clear. This war has been a failure. There were no WMDs. We have not spread democracy. We have not scared the terrorists. We have not emerged looking stronger. Our eventual effort to stave off total collapse and civil war in Iraq may have been a partial success, but that is not the same thing as victory. And in 10 years, when we forget how 2005 felt, it will be important to remember this clearly, rather than to have tricked ourselves into claiming a victory because that felt better at the time.

July 28, 2008

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SURGE.

The line on the Right lately has been that Iraq is about one thing: The surge. And it worked. So Iraq worked. That seemed a bit odd given how many forces and factors have been at play in Iraq, so Super Intern Dylan Matthews and I asked 10 experts to weight the importance of the surge in the reduction in violence over the last two years. Is it truly a clean win showing American Troops 1, Chaos 0? Sadly, their answers suggested the story is rather more complicated.

July 22, 2008

IT'S NOT ABOUT MALIKI.

Jason Zengerle is confusing me. "There's no denying that liberals who once derided Maliki as a Bush administration stooge are now touting him as the authentic and sovereign voice of the Iraqi people," writes Zengerle. "But conservatives are doing their own flip-flop as well."

It's possible that I had an opinion on Maliki's stoogedom in recent months, though I can't recall one. When a single politician requires American support, Iranian support, Islamist support, and sectarian support to stay in power, trying to unravel who's pulling which string is a fool's endeavor. But the importance of Maliki's remarks has little to do with their grassroots legitimacy. Rather, we know, from polling, that the majority of the Iraqi people want us out. In March, ABC polled the Iraqi people, asking "do you think the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is making security in our country better, worse, or having no effect on the security situation? 61 percent said worse. Another 73 percent said "they oppose" the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. Additionally, we now know that the closest thing Iraq has to a sovereign government think it's in their best political interest for us to leave. And the Iraqi people will know the government has asked us to leave. The question of Maliki's independence is entirely beside the point. If the government doesn't want us there and the people don't want us there, then it's time for us to go.

July 21, 2008

THE MYSTERY OF THE MISSING MALIKI WALKBACK.

When the prime minister of a foreign government makes a comment that could be understood as critical of the foreign power conducting a military occupation of his country, there are helpful ways that comments could be walked back, and unhelpful ways that comment could be walked back. A helpful way would be a statement from the prime minister's office saying that Obama's plan has merit, McCain's plan has merit also, and nothing Maliki said should be understood as expressing a preference between the two. That sort of press release would seem independent, even statesman-esque.

An unhelpful way the comment could be walked back is if the retraction comes not from the prime minister, but from a spokesperson. And if it's released not by the prime minister's office, but by the press shop of the occupying military. And if rather than say what was wrong in the comment, or why it should be understood differently, they say, without giving examples, that it was “misunderstood and mistranslated,” and come off like a kid who's been forced to apologize but doesn't have a clear idea of what he's supposed to be sorry for. That's not helpful. That just proves the point of the original comment: The continued American military presence makes the Iraqi government look weak and manipulable, and it's in Iraq's interest for it to end.

Meanwhile, this is the 21st century, and when prime minister's give interviews to newspapers, the newspapers tape the interviews. And then when the papers are challenged, they release the audio tapes to other news organizations for verification:

in an audio recording of Mr. Maliki’s interview that Der Spiegel provided to The New York Times, Mr. Maliki seemed to state a clear affinity for Mr. Obama’s position, bringing it up on his own in an answer to a general question on troop presence.

The following is a direct translation from the Arabic of Mr. Maliki’s comments by The Times: “Obama’s remarks that — if he takes office — in 16 months he would withdraw the forces, we think that this period could increase or decrease a little, but that it could be suitable to end the presence of the forces in Iraq.”

He continued: “Who wants to exit in a quicker way has a better assessment of the situation in Iraq.”

Mr. Maliki’s top political adviser, Sadiq al-Rikabi, declined to comment on the remarks, but spoke in general about the Iraqi position on Sunday. Part of that position, he said, comes from domestic political pressure to withdraw.

“Foreign soldiers in the middle of the most populated areas are not without their side effects,” he said. “Shouldn’t we look to an end for this unhealthy situation?”

Maliki's quote is authentic. So too is the quote from his political adviser asking for "an end for this unhealthy situation," where "unhealthy situation" refers to the American occupation of Iraq. So too were the quotes from a week ago, when Maliki's spokesperson said "we need to agree on the principle of setting a deadline." This stuff isn't complicated: In the past week, the Iraqi prime minister, his spokesman, and his political adviser have all called for an end to the occupation and a public promise that the American troops will begin to withdraw from Iraqi territory. Folks can disagree with that argument, and uphold that in our position as enlightened imperialists, we need not listen to the government that we helped install. But at this point, the Iraqi government has made as clear a public play for withdrawal as they possibly could. We're long past the place where the direction of their preferences can be denied.

July 10, 2008

SAY GOODBYE.

In 2004, McCain attended a Council on Foreign Relations event where he was asked, “What would or should we do if, in the post-June 30th period, a so-called sovereign Iraqi government asks us to leave, even if we are unhappy about the security situation there?" He answered:

Well, if that scenario evolves than I think it’s obvious that we would have to leave because — if it was an elected government of Iraq, and we’ve been asked to leave other places in the world. If it were an extremist government then I think we would have other challenges, but I don’t see how we could stay when our whole emphasis and policy has been based on turning the Iraqi government over to the Iraqi people.”
Today, The Washington Post reports that the Maliki government is ready to force the issue:
Iraqi spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said in Baghdad on Wednesday that a U.S. pullout could be completed in several years. "It can be 2011 or 2012," he said. "We don't have a specific date in mind, but we need to agree on the principle of setting a deadline."
Read that second part again: "We need to agree on the principle of setting a deadline." In other words, we're being asked to set a date for departure. We're being asked to leave by the theoretically sovereign government of Iraq -- and certainly the one we have imbued with legitimacy. If we reject those demands, then we are, simply, occupiers.

Four years ago, John McCain knew exactly what to do in this situation. "I don’t see how we could stay when our whole emphasis and policy has been based on turning the Iraqi government over to the Iraqi people,” he said. Does he still hold that view? Or has he -- dare I say it? -- flip-flopped?

June 24, 2008

ONE MORE IRAQ POST.

One last point that didn't really fit in the other posts (I've not been talking about Iraq enough lately). Brooks says that, "Many of the people who are dubbed bad guys actually got this one right."

This question of "right" is an interesting one. The "success" of the surge exists in contrast to the failure of the previous policy. It's not proof that alternative policies that were not tried would have returned lesser results. Insofar as the debate was between proponents of the surge and supporters of the Iraq Study Group's recommendations, the question of who got it "right" would require an analysis of what would've happened had we implemented the ISG's strategy. My sense is that a phased withdrawal married to a diplomatic surge was, and remains, the right way to go, but folks can argue the point.

Folks, however, are not arguing the point. Rather, a lot of people are saying that the post-surge period is better than the pre-surge period. In a limited sense, that seems true (though some experts are doubtful). But that's neither here nor there on the question of which strategy was "the right" one. Everyone agrees Bush's original strategy was wrong. And the ISG approach was never tried.

THE SURGE'S HELPERS.

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To sharpen one of the arguments from my earlier post, when analyzing reduced violence in Iraq, you have to try and figure out the mechanisms, and whether they represent real changes in the underlying situation or ephemeral improvements that will worsen as soon as our deployment, or some other factor, changes.

As I understand the situation, experts credit four main trends for the reduction in violence: Some of it was due to ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, which effectively ended conflict in the city by leaving Shias without Sunnis to kill. Some was the Anbar Awakening, where a set of Sunni tribes turned on al Qaeda offshoots that were threatening their autonomy. We armed these tribes, and their war was effective. Some was Sadr's decision to enhance his political legitimacy by directing his militias to temporarily stand down. Some was the addition of more troops dispersed through the actual communities. This made them more effective fighting units, and increased their ability to hunt insurgents.

Some of these effects are temporary. Some aren't. It's a safe bet that Sunnis aren't moving back to Baghdad any time soon, so the violence in that city should remain low. The Sunni tribes that participated in the Anbar Awakening won't welcome a resurgent al Qaeda, but nor will they necessarily welcome a centralized Shia government attempting to assert control. And now they're heavily armed. It's possible a deal will be struck, and it's possible a civil war will break out. Sadr's troops will remain quiet unless Sadr decides he wants to wage a guerrilla war. And our troops will only be there so long. Our force density might have convinced some of the actors to lay low, but as the Other Klein argues, our forces won't be there forever:

Continue reading "THE SURGE'S HELPERS." »

THAT SUCCESSFUL SURGE.

If David Brooks is going to write a column about the Surge and intellectual honesty, he should probably mention such events as Moqtada al-Sadr's strategic pause, the 2005-2006 ethnic cleansing in Baghdad which helped reduce ethnic tensions by ending ethnic diversity, and the Anbar Awakening which required arming Sunni tribes and thus entrenching decentralization. Pretending that Iraqi violence and instability is an output with one input -- in this case, the number of American troops -- is foolish.

That said, the argument over the surge was never an argument positing that more troops couldn't lead to less violence. Folks forget this, but the surge was actually part of Howard Dean's 2004 candidacy, when he was running as an anti-war candidate. In June 2003, on Meet the Press, he said, "I can tell you one thing, though. We need more troops in Afghanistan. We need more troops in Iraq now." I disagreed with him, but that was the plan: More troops, leading to less violence, leading to withdrawal. It was a plan that Democrats, even liberal Democrats, supported. Would Brooks like to credit Dean as a military visionary?

The argument over Bush's surge was in fact an argument over whether we needed a strategy which continued the war indefinitely, or a strategy where success was defined in an achievable way, and an end was sought to the conflict. The former won out, and administration replaced political goals with security goals. But given sufficient manpower and treasure, America could tamp down on violence in Iraq indefinitely. We could start up a draft, and deploy 7 million troops to the country, which would probably quiet down daily squabbling pretty quickly. But many of us felt an endless deployment in Iraq was a frankly bad idea. This was because we felt the indefinite continuation of the war in Iraq a bad idea. My friend Matt Duss put it well in a post to Tapped last year:

Continue reading "THAT SUCCESSFUL SURGE." »

May 26, 2008

THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

One of the interesting paradoxes of the McCain campaign is that you either have to assume he's a dedicated warmonger who prioritizes imperialist conquest over sensible analysis of the situation, or, as his campaign would have it, an inattentive reactionary who says warmongerish things because he's not really thought through the consequences. Conservatives, for instance, make a big deal about how unfairly liberals are treating McCain when they say he wants to be in Iraq for 100 years. What he actually said was that he wanted to be in Iraq for 100 years in a peaceful, friendly, strategic-partnership context, much like what we have in South Korea. It was 100 years of benign military occupation, not 100 years of war. This is apparently supposed to be exculpatory.

But it doesn't make sense on a couple levels. In South Korea, you have a relatively homogenous population, with one government that's broadly recognized as legitimate, and facing an external threat from the north. Hence, Americans on the border are welcomed. In Iraq, the divisions are internal, and massing American divisions on the border isn't of much use. Worse, our presence is not seen as the protective presence of a friend, but the continuing humiliation of an occupier.

Thus, it's entirely predictable that Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the most powerful cleric in Iraq, is saying that Iraq will not sign a "strategic partnership" with "U.S occupiers" as long as he has breath in his body. It wouldn't have been hard to predict that the nationalist clerics who largely control Iraq's societal stability would not support the permanent presence of a largely Christian army immune from Iraqi legal prosecution and loyal to another government. The best world interpretation of McCain's remarks is that he didn't think this would prove an impediment. Frankly, I felt safer when he was just being touted as a warmonger.

May 8, 2008

WHAT HAS THE SURGE DONE?

Lawrence Kaplan is being admirably straightforward here:

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Was the increase in US troops at the start of 2007 also partially responsible for the progress you describe?

Kaplan: This is the subject of fierce debate in the US -- because to ascribe progress to the "surge" means to say that George W. Bush did something right. I think it is impossible to disentangle the progress that comes from the tribes switching sides, from the new American strategy, from the fact that Shiite radical Muqtada al-Sadr has stood down and the surge. My sense is that the influx of 30,000 new American troops holds the least explanatory power. Most important were the tribes. And their switching sides predates the surge.

What Kaplan elides here is that the definition of "progress" is actually quite contested. Is progress a short-term reduction in violence that comes from an unsustainable increase in American force and troop presence? Is it arming and empowering Sunni tribes who've little interest in submitting to a centralized government? Is it waging war against Sadr and other figures with grassroots legitimacy? A lot of the frustration liberals have had with the Surge commentary is that the original plan behind the Surge was to increase security in order to accelerate political reconciliation. Security did increase, but reconciliation has arguably backslid. Some even argue that the Surge has made reconciliation less likely in the long-run. Is that progress, or is it regression? Indeed, I think the question of the Surge has actually been overwhelmed by the question of Bush, to the detriment of folks on both sides. Rather than argue about the patient dying on the table, we've been debating whether we like the doctor. But what else were we going to do? Until you change the doctor, you can't change the treatment.

April 11, 2008

FUND THE TROOPS!

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I'm glad to see the Democrats muddying up the latest Iraq funding supplemental with amendments and add-ons. Bush keeps swearing he'll veto anything but a clean bill, and if he'd like to veto a series of Iraq funding bills, I see no reason not to let him. But I wish the Democrats were being a bit more strategic as to what they were attaching to the legislation. As of now, the list appears to range from a second stimulus package to levee repair in the Gulf. The idea is that "by tying the war funding to a host of issues including unemployment, the housing crisis and trade with Colombia, Democrats hope to paint Bush and his allies as more concerned about Iraq’s problems than those at home." However, Bush's inevitable argument that these are unrelated issues will, in fact, hold water, as they are, in fact, unrelated issues.

Better would be tying the bill to a series of riders that actually relate. The new GI Bill legislation proposed by Sen. James Webb would be one option. So too would be Webb's legislation to guarantee soldiers rest time equal to their deployment time. Similarly, policy riders requiring the president to clearly articulate our goals and the conditions for success would be useful. Slap those on, and then let him veto. Let him veto again and again and again. If he doesn't want to fund the troops, it's true, no one can make him.

(Photo used under a Creative Commons license from Soldier's Media Center.)

April 2, 2008

END OF THE SURGE.

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Spack has an article on how Sadr killed the surge (er, the US military strategy, not the small DC band):

The trend toward increased violence in early 2008 does not rise to the level of the bloodshed Iraq experienced in mid-to-late 2006, before the surge began. But it does underscore the limits of what the surge achieved, according to U.S. government officials and outside experts, even on the security front where the Bush administration argued it was most successful. "The fact is, the ISF [Iraqi security forces] couldn't fulfill a major campaign against an insurgent group on its own," said a U.S. intelligence analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity. "I personally think that's the real story. The ISF , despite the surge, and despite the [rhetoric from the Bush administration that] 'they'll stand up as we stand down,' couldn't fulfill their core requirement."
That shows the extent of our tactical failure. But the very fact of this operation underscores the surge's broader strategic failure: The surge was to create the security conditions that would allow for political reconciliation. Powerful Shiite politician Maliki launching a ground war against powerful Shiite nationalist leader Sadr is not what I would call "reconciliation." That Maliki then had to send emissaries to Iran in order to ask Sadr for a ceasefire further underscores how orthogonal we are to the conflict. On the bright side, we're spending billions to arm the players!

(Image used under a Creative Commons license from the Soldier Media Center.)

March 31, 2008

WHAT WAS IRAQ WORTH?

Zbigndjksutjkjniew Brezinski writes, "if the American people had been asked more than five years ago whether Bush's obsession with the removal of Saddam Hussein was worth 4,000 American lives, almost 30,000 wounded Americans and several trillion dollars -- not to mention the less precisely measurable damage to the United States' world-wide credibility, legitimacy and moral standing -- the answer almost certainly would have been an unequivocal 'no.'"

It's worth remembering the very false bill of goods under which the war was sold. It was to be a quick war -- a couple months at most -- where the Iraqi people greeted us as liberators and paid for reconstruction through oil revenues. It was sold as a humanitarian mission on the one hand, and self-defense on the other. And it was to set off a wave of democratization across the Middle East.

In the final accounting, literally every premise was a lie. There were no weapons of mass destruction. The war cost trillions, is ongoing after five years, and has not endeared us to the Iraqi people. There has been no wave of democratization. And our "humanitarian mission" took a relatively stable, though unquestionably repressive, society and killed between tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands. No one would have taken this deal. But it was never offered. Rather, the Bush administration, with the enthusiastic aid of the media, did a remarkable job hiding the costs and making this an issue of moral blackmail, rather than cost-benefit calculations. They never had to answer the question of how much they were willing to spend on this war, and how many lives they were willing to lose over it. And without answering those questions, there were never really benchmarks for success or for failure, and the American people never had anything realistic to use in their estimates.

March 20, 2008

THE WISDOM OF WITHDRAWAL.

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As Matt says, it gets a bit tiresome pointing out the asymmetry in assumptions that infects the public debate about Iraq, but it's important. For some reason, staying in is always evaluated according to it best case chance for success (we fix everything!) and leaving according to the worst case scenario for failure (everyone kills each other!). But look, lots of things can happen. As Don Rumsfeld says, every instant we're in Iraq, we're at the mercy of unknown unknowns. One day, a soldier could shoots into a shrine, or mistake an imam for a threat, and suddenly there are massive riots aimed at killing our troops and ejecting us from the country. Or someday, the insurgents might figure out an attack that kills 300 American troops in one murderous blast. Will we run from the country? Will we exact bloody vengeance? Will either outcome enhance stability or achieve our tactical objectives?

The fact of it is, every day we're in there is one more day in which something truly unexpected and destructive could occur. Which is one more reason an American withdrawal makes sense: We can control it. The longer we stay in Iraq, the likelier it becomes that something catastrophic occurs to force us out. “What happens if the Ayatollah Sistani gets assassinated?” Larry Korb once asked me. “All hell will break loose. Or what if they shell the green zone and kill several hundred Americans? What do you think the Congress will do? If you set a date, you control your own destiny.” The longer we stay in Iraq, the less control we have, and the more likely it is that we'll eventually be driven from the country, or leave under circumstances not of our choosing, in which we're not able to set conditions for an orderly transfer of power. At this point, we're sitting at the blackjack table, and we're down, and we're not leaving because we're waiting for the big score. But the likelier outcome is that we go bust. At some point, you have to be willing to limit the magnitude and cost of your failure, even if it means giving up your shot at success.

(Image used under a Creative Commons license from Soldier's Media Center.)

March 19, 2008

MR. AQI AND US.

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The US Military has been working to profile suicide bombers in Iraq, to understand where they come from, what motivates them, how they end up on such a murderous and self-negating path. Today, at TAP, Spencer Ackerman reports the results of their research, and draws a picture of the man he calls Mr AQI -- a man who America, in essence, created.

Counterfactual conditionals are always problematic, but in all likelihood, according to MNF-I's own profile, if the United States. were not in Iraq, Mr. AQI would be back in his taxi in Algiers or Jedda. Were it not for Abu Ghraib -- which, of course, never would have happened had we not invaded -- Mr. AQI would never have felt that it was his religious duty to kill Americans. And were it not for the war, thousands of Americans and possibly hundreds of thousands of Iraqis would be alive, right now, and all without a propaganda windfall that spikes terrorist recruitment for the extremist lurking around the mosque trying to generate new Mr. AQIs. And what is true of our foreign-born Mr. AQI is all the more true of the perhaps 95 percent of AQI that's Iraqi Sunni. Not one of them would have any reason to be a member of AQI if George Bush did not give him one.
This was always the problem with the flypaper strategy -- it assumed a static population of violent extremists, of which a disproportionate number would be drawn to Iraq to be cut down by our forces. But the jihadist population isn't static, it's dynamic. It swells and ebbs in response to events. It was swelled by the invasion of Iraq. By Abu Ghraib. By every time we called for air strikes and missed. By every time we busted into the wrong house at 2 in the morning and dragged out fathers in front of their sons, humiliated uncles in front of their nephews. By every day we've occupied in Iraq, every day in which even our benign and merited efforts to protect our forces and root out extremists still meant overpowering ordinary Iraqis and driving home our control over their society. We're not catching the flies. We're breeding them.

(Photo used under a Creative Commons license from Flickr user PingNews.)

March 10, 2008

O'HANLON'S BACK.

I don't really know enough about Iraq to adjudicate a debate between Spencer Ackerman and Michael O'Hanlon. But it certainly seems to me that the New York Times shouldn't simply be reprinting O'Hanlon's "benchmarks" without giving readers some way to evaluate whether they're worth listening to. O'Hanlon, after all, is anything but an objective source. He's a media beast who's currently fighting a war over his reputation, a war started when the army gave him a guided, planned tour demonstrating their "progress" in Iraq, and he wrote a puff piece on it. Now he desperately needs to advance a narrative of progress if he's not going to be laughed out of every foreign policy room forevermore. If the Times wants a set of Iraq benchmarks, they should convene a panel of independent experts, or develop one themselves. Letting O'Hanlon grade the conflict is rather like letting Scott Templeton fact check his own work.

Update: Ilan Goldenberg notes that O'Hanlon's methodology is...nonexistent. "There is no way to refute it because his scoring isn’t up anywhere. It’s not in the Iraq Index and the closest thing he has is an A, B, C grading system from a month and a half ago. So, five out of eleven it is because that’s what Mike O’Hanlon tells me it is." Thanks New York Times!

February 22, 2008

WAS THE SURGE A SUCCESS?

"Imagine," writes Michael Kinsley, "that you had been told in 2003 that when George W. Bush finished his second term, dozens of American soldiers and hundreds of Iraqis would be dying violently every month; that a major American goal would be getting the Iraqi government to temper its "de-Baathification" campaign so that Saddam Hussein's former henchmen could start running things again (because they know how); and "only" 100,000 American troops would be needed to sustain this equilibrium. You might have several words to describe this situation, but success would not be one of them."

Obama also put it well last night: The surge has been a tactical success masking a strategic blunder. We've tamped down on violence, but changed none of the underlying realities of the conflict, nor even discovered a clear pathway pointing towards reconciliation. Rather the opposite, in fact. We now see no pathway towards reconciliation, and our "bottom-up" strategy to rout al-Qaeda has been to heavily arm Sunni tribes who would sooner turn violently against the central government than submit to its authority. Again, there are a lot of words for this strategy, but success isn't one of them.

January 15, 2008

DE-RE-BAATHIFICATION.

"The [de-Baathification] law, celebrated by hard-line anti-Baathists and protested vigorously by Sunnis, is something like an Iraqi version of the 'Clean Skies Act,'" writes Alex Rossmiller. That's depressing, but true. Conservatives like Kristol are making a lot of hay of the fact that Iraq has passed something that is superficially designed to reverse the decision expelling all Baathists from the government. But wait! This law was the one supported by the most hardline, anti-Baathist groups. As Juan Cole says, "If the new law was good for ex-Baathists, then the ex-Baathists in parliament will have voted for it and praised it, right? And likely the Sadrists (hard line anti-Baath Shiites) and Kurds would be a little upset. Instead, parliament's version of this law was spearheaded by Sadrists, and the ex-Baathists in parliament criticized it." The law appears to have such provisions as preventing the reformation of the Baath Party, barring high-ranking officials from serving in government, and firing any who are currently serving.

Some reconciliation. As per usual, Cole has the fuller rundown, and you should read him. It's worth noting that this is the law William Kristol used to prove reconciliation yesterday, earning him a slapdown from the Times' editorial page and showing, again, that the Times thought they were particularly in need of an op-ed writer who would lie to their readership. Odd, that.

December 11, 2007

WHY THE RIGHT NEEDS CRAZY.

Michael Cohen is right to say that the NIE on Iran heralds a return of deterrence theory to American foreign policy. But in some ways, the more important takeaway from the passages Cohen quotes pertain to rational choice theory. Put simply: The Iranian regime was rational. It wasn't some eschatological head trip seeking the biggest weapon possible to speed the return of the 12th Imam. Instead, "Iran halted the [nuclear weapons] program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicat[ing] Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs."

The imputation of crazy was not only key to the case against Iran -- you don't want crazies controlling atomic weapons, after all -- but crucial to how we were supposed to respond to Iran. The government's religious fanaticism, we were told, made them impervious to traditional incentives-based approaches, and thus rendered regime change the only viable option. If we assumed a rational Iran -- one, for instance, that wouldn't want to be obliterated by Israel's submarine mounted, second strike capacities -- it wouldn't have made any sense to treat their pursuit of weaponry as an existential threat rather a play for power and prestige.

That's why an irrational Iran was so important. If you wanted to invade, you needed to make them crazy. So Frontpage was writing things like,"it is the apocalyptic element to Ahmadinejad’s faith combined with Iran’s nuclear ambitions that should draw the most serious attention. He believes that a great cataclysm of bloodshed anticipates the return of the 12th Imam, in particular the destruction of infidels – Jews and Christians – that will usher in a new dawn of Islamic worldwide dominance." The Telegraph helpfully informed us that "[Ahmedinejad] actively seeks to bring about an apocalyptic struggle between the righteous and the wicked to accelerate the return of the mahdi or Hidden Imam." Daniel Pipes spoke of his "mystical menace."

Continue reading "WHY THE RIGHT NEEDS CRAZY." »

December 10, 2007

CASH FOR PEACE.

You know, it really shouldn't have taken us this long to come up with a jobs program in Iraq. And it really shouldn't be limited to a couple thousand Sunnis. For all the talk of the military impacts of the surge, we're increasingly seeing that security gains are less about our efforts and more about internal political decisions by indigenous actors -- see, for instance, Petraeus's fulsome praise of, yes, Moqtada al-Sadr, for helping out with the security environment. But, for whatever reason, our politicians seem achingly incapable of simply leaving Iraq. So it's worth asking if a military deployment is really the most cost-effective way to spend billions and billions in Iraq.

This site, in fact, asks the question well. "The US budget for Iraq in FY 2006 comes to $3,749/Iraqi. This is more than double their per person GDP. It's like spending $91,000 per person in the US. Why not just bribe the whole country?" But seriously: Why not just bribe the whole country? If we're determined to commit an enormous amount of resources to the Iraqi people, why not let the Ghost of Milton Friedman take over and simply design some sort of program that offers enormous economic benefits in exchange for reductions in violence? Given that the administration is already signaling its belief that you can reduce violence by paying off Sunni youths, and given that transferring large sacks of cash to tribal leaders was a major force behind the Anbar Awakening, why not keep spending flat, begin to withdraw troops, and convert those funds into simple cash payments? Seems likelier to work than anything we're doing now, less likely to get our troops killed, and far more likely to give disparate portions of the population a reason to enforce peace. How you'd end such a program might prove tricky down the road, but so too is ending an increasingly permanent occupation.

November 14, 2007

Does The GOP Need Iraq?

I genuinely hope Joe Klein is right and Iraq's improvements are durable.  And contrary to Joe's implication, I don't think, politically, this is something for Democrats to fear.  The better Iraq is doing, the less of an issue it will be in the election.  The less of an issue it is in the election, the more issues like the health care crisis, the mortgage meltdown, inequality, and global warming will come to the fore.  Indeed, the less Iraq dominates the agenda, the more alternative foreign policy visions can emerge, and be tested, and become the new context for the discussion  All that is good for the Left.

Indeed, I occasionally believe that Republicans know that once American troops leave Iraq, the country's need for the Republican Party, at least temporarily, will cease.  The Iraq War has increasingly come to define the Republican party.  They've sacrificed almot everything else for it, from fiscal discipline to social conservatism (see the Giuliani campaign).  So long as troops remain in Iraq, the Republicans can at least argue that they need to finish the job they've begun, and that the Democrats lack sufficient commitment to victory.  End it, and you end their relevance, at least until they can reinvent themselves as the party of closed borders.  My sense is that, consciously or unconsciously, some of the GOP knows this, and it underpins their unwillingness to even begin drawing the conflict to a close.  At this point, the end of the war would be existentially unmooring for the Party.

October 3, 2007

Does The Military Matter?

The apparent drop in civilian deaths in Iraq is very good news. And not because it means our Iraq strategy is working. Indeed, the forces behind this have little to nothing to do with American forces. The so-called Anbar Awakening is a Sunni operation, while the unilateral ceasefire of the Mahdi Army was Sadr's decision. The pacification of Baghdad, meanwhile, has a lot to do with the fact that Baghdad's effectively been ethnically cleaned, converting from a majority Sunni city to a 70% Shiite city -- they're running out of people to kill. Our troops aren't terribly involved in this change, and that's a good thing: Any changes brought about by American forces will be temporary. Changes that reflect shifts in the underlying dynamics of the country may endure.

I was talking to an Iraq expert yesterday and asked him whether it was correct to say that the military questions -- how many troops we have deployed, what their strategy is, etc -- are increasingly beside the point. He said yes, and then continued on to say that he forgets how different the conversation in the country is from the conversation among Iraq experts. Among those folks, he said, it was taken for granted that the military issues were largely a distraction, and the only questions worth asking were political and regional in nature. Some think the military's doing harm, others think it's offering a bit of benefit, but no one thinks the troops are making much of a difference one way or the other, or that their strategy has anything to do with the long-term success of Iraq. And the focus on what the military is doing, rather than on a diplomatic surge and Iran's involvement and all the rest, is actually quite harmful.

September 19, 2007

Is The Surge Working?

Given all the domestic dispute over whether the Surge is working, and whether the measurements are honest, and what "working" really means anyway, it's interesting to actually find out what the Iraqis think. So the BBC and ABC News polled them:

Is The Surge Working

So the overwhelming majority thought the surge made things worse. Then came those who thought it made no difference. And then, hovering around 10 percent, were those who thought they detected some improvements. Given that the Surge is in theory, about Iraqi security rather than American politics, these are disheartening numbers.

Also: Could someone please inform the BBC that blue should fill the bar for things going well and red should should be the color for all that's gone awry? I find this pleasing, powder-blue denoting increases in deadly violence to be a bit confusing.

August 31, 2007

The Surge's Untrustworthy Numbers

The big factoid in favor of the surge is that violence is down. As Bush put it a few months back, "Within Baghdad, our military reports that despite an upward trend in May, sectarian murders in the capital are significantly down from what they were in January."

Devil, meet details. The Pentagon classifies violence as "sectarian killings," not simple murders. So those numbers don't count, among other things, Shia on Shia violence in the South, Sunni on Sunni violence -- including between al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and Iraqis Sunnis -- in the North, carbombings, and much else. But even within this vastly constrained definition, the Pentagon, without letting anyone in on their methodology, is changing the definition from month to month. Ilan Goldberg did the lord's work by graphing the Pentagon's numbers from the last few reports, and watch how the numbers for the very same months change with each successive report:

Iraq Casualties

And we're not just seeing random fluctuations -- they're mainly changing downward, in order to reflect lower sectarian violence. But why would the January 2006 be lower in the June report than in the March report? Were the dead resurrected?

"But wait!" You say (because you're rude, and you interrupt a lot). "In the June report, killings were revised upward! That's true. But the timing matters. As Goldberg explains, "The impact here is that it makes the “pre surge” situation look extraordinarily dire and therefore signals progress thereafter."

The shell game here has to do with the term "sectarian murders," which the Pentagon is apparently defining differently from month to month, albeit without telling anyone what's changed. In other words, you can't trust these numbers. But they're the ones that are being used -- and will be used -- to argue for the Surge's success.

August 24, 2007

Does the Internet Need Fixing? Sadly, Yes.

By Deborah Newell Tornello a.k.a. litbrit

How could I have missed this bit of lovely on Tuesday?  Oh yeah, it was the first full-day of school.  No matter--is it any less relevant today?  Sadly, No.

August 10, 2007

Knocking Over The Chessboard

Does Ken Pollack realize quite what he's proposing here?

We did meet with a number of top Iraqi policymakers over there and we found exactly what you said, which was absolutely no progress at that strategic political level. These are people who know that if there were really free and fair elections, they might not win nearly as many seats as they have under the current prevailing conditions of a failed state and a security vacuum. I came away from the trip believing it may be necessary to have new elections in Iraq and maybe even a new electoral system that actually could produce a government that is more representative of the Iraqi people, with leaders who actually would be much more willing to make compromises.

So he's suggesting, essentially, that the Americans unilaterally dissolve the sovereign Iraqi government and demand new elections that would be conducted in some theoretically more proportionate way, and which would be more amenable to compromises that would, in turn, rely on marginalizing the country's most powerful parties and thus angering exactly the groups we need to abide by compromises.

What if General David Petraeus just shot himself in the face instead? Wouldn't that have essentially the same effect?

August 1, 2007

The Way To Go in Iraq

Peter Galbraith's piece on "The Way To Go" in Iraq is about the best I've seen at digging beneath daily outrages and promises and laying out the underlying tensions tearing apart the society. For instance, the other day, I saw, and recommended highly, the film No End in Sight. The movie spends a lot of time on the tragic mistakes made in the immediate aftermath of the war: Decommissioning the Iraqi army, allowing looting, De-Baathification, etc. But as Galbraith explains, though the American's may have accelerated the civil war through policies like De-Baathification, it's not at all clear that a different way forward could have prevented it:

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim leads the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC, previously known as SCIRI), which is Iraq's leading Shiite party and a critical component of Prime Minister al-Maliki's coalition. He is the sole survivor of eight brothers. During Saddam's rule Baathists executed six of them. On August 29, 2003, a suicide bomber, possibly linked to the Baathists, blew up his last surviving brother, and predecessor as SCIRI leader, at the shrine of Ali in Najaf. Moqtada al-Sadr, Hakim's main rival, comes from Iraq's other prominent Shiite religious family. Saddam's Baath regime murdered his father and two brothers in 1999. Earlier, in April 1980, the regime had arrested Moqtada's father-in-law and the father-in-law's sister—the Grand Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and Bint al-Huda. While the ayatollah watched, the Baath security men raped and killed his sister. They then set fire to the ayatollah's beard before driving nails into his head. De-Baathification is an intensely personal issue for Iraq's two most powerful Shiite political leaders, as it is to hundreds of thousands of their followers who suffered similar atrocities.

This is a society with, shall we say, some baggage. But the Surge was supposed to give them time to work all that out. By flooding the country with American troops and temporarily stabilizing the security situation, the Bush administration hoped to give the Iraqi government time to make progress on political reconciliation. Well, the Iraqi government went on vacation, so that's unlikely. But more to the point, the substance of "reconciliation" -- oil-sharing laws, revising the Constitution to create more centralization, limited re-Baathification -- doesn't quite address the underlying tensions splitting the society:

Sunni insurgents object to Iraq being run by Shiite religious parties, which they see as installed by the Americans, loyal to Iran, and wanting to define Iraq in a way that excludes the Sunnis. Sunni fundamentalists consider the Shiites apostates who deserve death, not power. The Shiites believe that their democratic majority and their historical suffering under the Baathist dictatorship entitle them to rule. They are not inclined to compromise with Sunnis, whom they see as their longstanding oppressors, especially when they believe most Iraqi Sunnis are sympathetic to the suicide bombers that have killed thousands of ordinary Shiites. The differences are fundamental and cannot be papered over by sharing oil revenues, reemploying ex-Baathists, or revising the constitution. The war is not about those things.

The war, in other words, is not about anything we can control, or even particularly effect.

May 16, 2007

Hackin' and Iraq'n

I mentioned the other day that the Bush administration's tendency to prioritize loyalty over competence has been at least as damaging to the government as their crazed fiscal management.  So I'm glad to see Tom Friedman suggest that his audience read  Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City  "details [as to] the extent to which Americans recruited to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad were chosen, at times, for their loyalty toward Republicanism rather than expertise on Islamism."  Two CPA staffers, for instance, were asked whether they supported Roe v. Wade, assumedly because Iraqis are really concerned over whether the American Constitution includes an implicit right to privacy.

It's tolerance for this sort of politicization of the bureaucracy that I find most enraging about the modern GOP.  I can respect disagreements over abortion, taxes, Iraq, and all the rest.  I'll fight to win them, but I grant that they're often offered in good faith and real conviction.  But part of taking seriously the Republican argument on Iraq is believing that they want our mission their to succeed.  And that desire is utterly incompatible with a tolerance for croneyism and the appointment of politicized hacks.  That the Bush administration's actions with the CPA never elicited a cry -- much less a hue! -- from the Right is truly distressing.

May 15, 2007

Dispatches From When The Country Went Crazy: Kill 'em All Edition

While writing this post yesterday, I came across this gem from Paul Berman, writing in a January 2004 Slate forum reconsidering the Iraq War.  "[The] largest of facts," he wrote, "is the rise of a certain kind of political movement—movements animated by paranoid hatreds, by apocalyptic fantasies, and by the fanatical desire to kill people en masse. These have been the big totalitarian movements, Nazism, Fascism, Stalinism, and a few others—movements whose greatest goal was to destroy liberal civilization...The totalitarian visions live on. Only, instead of being called fascism or some other name from the past, the visions of the present are called radical Islamism and Baathism and suchlike, with doctrines duly descended from their European progenitors—the totalitarianism of the modern Muslim world."

I forget the elegant disingenuousness with which the war was often sold.  Notice how Berman recasts a fight against Saddam Hussein as a war against a unified totalitarian ideology.  This despite the fact that the Baathism, under Saddam's Iraq, and radical Islamism, under Khomeini's Iran, had spent over a decade killing each other (with America arming not one, but both).  Notice how these movements are ripped of positive -- which is different than "good" -- goals and recast as a mindless attack on "liberal civilization."

But that's just the start of the crazy.  Remember, here, that Berman was the author of the hugely influential liberal hawk manifesto Terror and Liberalism, and a main character in George Packer's The Assassin's Gate.  He goes on to write: "Sept. 11 did not come from a single Bad Guy—it was a product of the larger totalitarian wave, and the only proper response was to comprehend the size and depth of that larger wave, and find ways to begin rolling it back, militarily and otherwise—mostly otherwise. To roll it back for our own sake, and everyone else's sake, Muslims' especially. Iraq, with its somewhat antique variation of the Muslim totalitarian idea, was merely a place to begin, after Afghanistan, with its more modern variation."

Iraq and Afghanistan were just places to begin!  We were supposed to take on every country with a whiff of autocracy and a useable set of prayer mats!  It's staggering stuff.

March 13, 2007

Are The People Interested?

I think Eve's perspective on the Democrats' withdrawal plan is a bit skewed:

Some nasty stuff's on the way for the Democratic deal on Iraq...Here's the bitchy subtitle of today's Post's lead editorial: "It makes perfect sense, if the goal is winning votes in the United States."

Wince. But I don't think it even does make perfect sense as a purely political strategy: The plan faces immense obstacles to get to the House floor, at which point it probably won't pass the Senate, and if it did, it'd be summarily vetoed -- drawing Democrats into a constitutional showdown with Bush. Is that what people are interested in?

Well, yeah. According to the most recent polling, Iraq is the most important single problem facing our country, outpolling the nearest runner-up ("economy/jobs") by 21 percent. 67 percent disapprove of Bush's handling of the issue, 63 percent oppose the surge, and 51% say they're concerned "Congress won't go far enough in pressing the President to reduce troop levels in Iraq." So yes, I think the American people are decidedly interest in the issue.

Moreover, the framing of Eve's post is odd. Americans are, of course, not interested in a bunch of procedural wrangling leading to gridlock. But the bloodless presentation above obscures a fairly astonishing political event: After an election in which Americans overwhelmingly voted in the anti-war party and amidst polls showing 58% think we should withdraw within the next year, the President is blocking all action on the issue, blocking all action on the electorate's top priority. It is, of course, soundly undemocratic. To suggest that Congress should stop pushing for more direct enactment of public preferences because Bush has telegraphed his intent to flout the will of the country is really missing the forest for the trees.

November 21, 2006

Imperial Groans

Speaking of self esteem retention, the Nitpicker catches prominent military fetishist Lawrence Kaplan cynically concocting troop opinions in order to safeguard his own hawkish outlook. In TNR's big Iraq issue, Kaplan writes:

For the sake of American soldiers...who speak with a sense of ownership about their war and see themselves as a progressive force on the Iraqi landscape--and who, according to surveys by the Military Times and the Pew Research Center, hold opinions on the war that run almost exactly counter to those registered at home--be grateful that the machinery of war overwhelms the din from Washington.

But the Military Times hasn't conducted a survey in over a year and, when they did, rather than troop opinions proving precise counterpoints to public polls, they tracked rather closely. At the time, 60% of the troops supported the war and 50% of the public. But even that overstates. From The Military Times' website:

should not be read as representative of the military as a whole; the survey’s respondents are on average older, more experienced, more likely to be officers and more career-oriented than the military population. But the numbers are among the best measures of opinion in a difficult-to-survey population. The professional military seems to be lessening in its certainty about the wisdom of the Iraq intervention and the way it has been handled,” said Richard Kohn, a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina who studies civil-military relations. “This seems to be more and more in keeping with changes in public views, and that’s not surprising.”

As for Pew, well, the Nitpicker e-mailed them and they responded that they don't do surveys of soldiers. The closest them came was a survey of retired generals culled from Lexis-Nexis searches. Meanwhile, the most recent actual poll done of the soldiers found:

29% of the respondents, serving in various branches of the armed forces, said the U.S. should leave Iraq “immediately,” while another 22% said they should leave in the next six months. Another 21% said troops should be out between six and 12 months, while 23% said they should stay “as long as they are needed.”

So 76% of the troops want us out within a year. Funny how that wasn't mentioned in the article. Let's hope the din of Lawrence Kaplan doesn't overwhelm the voices of those he claims to honor.

November 16, 2006

TNR: Was Wrong, Is Wrong.

I was going to write a response to TNR's breathtakingly bad "We Were Wrong" editorial, but I couldn't possibly better what their former employee Spackerman says:

Please believe me when I say that this makes me want to cry, since I used to love working for TNR. But the magazine is setting itself up for making the same mistake over and over and over again. This is the emptiest of evasions -- a fetishization of "seriousness" without ever actually being serious. In one of my last pieces for them, I wrote that "Faced with a disastrous war, the most important consideration is not 'Were we wrong?' but 'Why were we wrong?' and 'How can we avoid being so wrong in the future?'" I begged TNR during my time there to address these last questions. But now it's dawned on me that my former friends never will.

Read the whole thing. For TNR, it should be no surprise that "We Were Wrong" actually equates to "They are wrong." The magazine only admits error as a way to sucker punch those they believe are even wronger than they -- "the realists," whose understanding that "American power may not be capable of transforming ancient cultures or deep hatreds...does not absolve us of the duty to conduct a foreign policy that takes its moral obligations seriously." This comes in an editorial explaining that the magazine's attempt to "take its moral obligations seriously" led it to commit a great and grave misjudgment.

To limn that sentence would be an actual exploration of why the magazine was wrong. To let it languish as platitude, however, is to seek credit for an apology that denies the actual utility of regret: Learning. This is an apology to all "whom might have been offended by the magazine's actions." It is not an admission of wrongdoing, nor evidence of change. And so it is worthless. There is no growth here, only an admission of defeat that denies all implication of systemic error. The magazine wasn't wrong, reality was. And TNR deeply regrets that.

August 11, 2006

The Trend Is Your Friend

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

At this point, there's no doubting that the Iraq War is an issue that helps Democrats and hurts Republicans in the 2006 elections.  You can see it in the polling on which party people trust to do better on the war -- the last year's polls show people consistently picking the Democrats.  September 2004 was the last time a majority of Americans thought the war was worth fighting.  Probably the neatest piece of polling comes from New Jersey -- when you mention Iraq, the Democratic candidate's advantage goes from one point to eight points!

Things have, in their slow and steady way, changed a lot between 2003 and now.  It's reasonable to extrapolate  these trends forward to 2008, because the mechanism that drives them will most likely remain intact.  Iraq is deteriorating and Americans are slowly becoming aware of that.  I'm pretty confident that in two years, whether it was right to go to war in Iraq will be a more divisive issue within the Republican Party than among Democrats.  Already Michael Steele has been talking down the Iraq War under a bizarre veil of faux-anonymity. 

Continue reading "The Trend Is Your Friend" »

April 16, 2006

How Much is Blowback Worth?

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Ezra has been engaging with this Tigerhawk fella recently, and I thought I might comment on his latest post.  As he says, it's a good thing that some Iraqi Sunnis are getting angry at al-Qaeda.  But it doesn't do a whole lot to solve the biggest problem facing Iraq -- namely, the ethnic hatreds between Sunnis and Shiites.  Taking al-Qaeda out of the picture would help a little with this problem, since they're interested in stirring up the conflict as much as possible.  But even if you could throw all of al-Qaeda out of Iraq tomorrow, the major factors driving the civil war would still be in place.  Matt Yglesias described the basic problem in his excellent post from August 2004:

We've got a Kurdish minority in the north that has fairly liberal views, some taste for democratic governance, and does not believe in the goal of a stable Iraqi state. In the center, by contrast, we've got our Sunnis who do believe in a stable Iraqi state (otherwise they get cut out of the oil) but very strongly oppose the notion of a majoritarian Iraq, as that would lead to Shiite domination. In the south are the Shia who, like the Sunnis, support the idea of a stable Iraqi state. The Shia seem split between a minority (Sadrists and SCIRI folk) who believe in clerical rule rather than democracy, and a majority (Sistani's folks and al-Dawa) who would like to create an illiberal, Shia-oriented, majoritarian democracy.

Continue reading "How Much is Blowback Worth?" »

December 11, 2005

Reality and its Discontents

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

I recently cast my vote for "Best Conservative Blog" in the 2005 Weblog Awards.  One of the things that inspired my vote was this series of posts by Jeff Goldstein of Protein Wisdom. 

No, I didn't vote for Jeff.  (He's not even on the ballot.)  One thing that fascinated me about his posts, which imagine fictional conversations between Iraqi militants, is that they demonstrate how focused many right-wing bloggers are on the lesser problem facing Iraq -- insurgents concerned with general anti-Western jihad -- and how totally unfocused they are on the greater problem -- the immense difficulty of constructing a stable government of any kind on top of the Bosnia-style ethnic strife that divides the country.  Even more darkly fascinating is the way that right-wing bloggers escape to fiction when the actual facts about Iraq become too politically troubling for them to handle. 

Continue reading "Reality and its Discontents" »

November 25, 2005

The Power of Ridicule

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Tony found an old cartoon a few days ago, and I think it's pretty indicative of how most people were thinking in late 2002:

hans_blix_at_home

There's a couple things to be said here about how the Bush Administration got Senators to vote for the Iraq War.

Continue reading "The Power of Ridicule" »

November 20, 2005

The Real Iraq Problem

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

One big reason Bush won the last election, and why he can maintain any support for the Iraq War, is his ability to misdescribe the war as an us-versus-some-enemy-we-shouldn't-embolden problem.  This is the frame that allows him to present withdrawal as cowardly and foolish, while continued occupation is the only sensible and courageous move.  The criticism of cutting and running (can someone tell me what the 'cutting' refers to in that expression?) and the "We fight them over there so we don't have to fight them over here" nonsense depend on this kind of framing.  The criticism of war critics as enemies of America is probably its most sinister expression. 

As far as the future of Iraq is concerned, what we actually have is a how-do-we-get-everybody-to-play-nice problem.  We need to get a bunch of interspersed ethnoreligious groups to put aside their longstanding grievances and see one another as fellow citizens in a democracy.  Given the extent to which the populations are swirled together and the  bloodiness of poorly supervised partitions (several million were killed when Pakistan split from India, and the countries are still often at each others' throats) dividing the country three ways isn't a great answer.  So we've got to find a way for them to live together. 

Continue reading "The Real Iraq Problem" »

November 19, 2005

A Democrat Actually Wrote This Post

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Some say that the Iraq War was fought for oil, but I find it more likely that it was fought for straw. Domestic reserves of the latter product have been severely depleted by Republican construction of straw men since the War on Terror began. The latest straw man provided by Iraq is Republican leaders' attempt to make people misattribute Duncan Hunter's sham withdrawal resolution to John Murtha, who had submitted a very different resolution to Congress. Republican representatives and Redstate hacks tried to pass off the resolution as a Democratic offering from John Murtha. I'm not clear whether people figured out the truth, but my less politically inclined friends were asking me about the withdrawal vote last night, and I was the first to explain to them what was really going on.

As the party in power, it's a lot easier for Republicans to misrepresent Democratic positions than vice versa. Except during Presidential elections, we don't have any national figures to clearly and firmly present our positions. So when the President opposes those who want to "cut and run", it's easy for non-plugged-in people to simply think that the Democratic plan amounts to no more than this.

November 13, 2005

Edwards Calls For Withdrawal, Rejoicing Ensues

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Being an enormous John Edwards fan, I've long awaited the day when he would come out and say that his Iraq vote was a mistake. It was one of the things I wanted to ask him about when I met him, but I decided to ask about health care and global poverty instead. So you can imagine that I'm thrilled to see his op-ed expressing exactly that sentiment in the Washington Post.

I'm quite happy with the content of the op-ed itself. It begins with a straightforward "I was wrong" and blames bad WMD intelligence for his vote. I regard his quasi-explanation of why he didn’t speak out against the war before – “It has been hard to say these words because those who didn't make a mistake -- the men and women of our armed forces and their families -- have performed heroically and paid a dear price” – as bullshit, but it’s the kind of sterilized bullshit that doesn’t pollute the rivers and makes decent fertilizer.

Continue reading "Edwards Calls For Withdrawal, Rejoicing Ensues" »

November 5, 2005

There's WMD, and Then There's WMD

Posted by Nicholas Beaudrot at Electoral Math

Kevin Drum has been trying to score some contrarian points while tracing back through the march to war in Iraq. He points out that as of September 2002, there was widespread agreement that Saddam Hussein had an active WMD program. This, I suspect, was not a subject of dispute. The Clinton administration had a difficult time forcing Saddam to abide by the terms of the post-Gulf War UN resolutions, going so far as to order bombings on two occasions. House and Senate Democrats who voted for the war weren't doing so out of a desire of democracy promotion, but because they thought, or at least said they thought, that Saddam was a threat. Here's Tom Daschle in 2002: "The threat posed by Saddam Hussein may not be imminent. But it is real. It is growing. And it cannot be ignored." This was the angle most pro-war Democrats took: Saddam would continue to try and rebuild his chemical and biological programs, and we'd just keep trying to knock them out, plus he's a bad guy anyway, so let's stop playing games and take him out now.

There was no doubt about Saddam's continued efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons. Where there was doubt was about Saddam's ability to develop nuclear weapons, and to deliver those weapons to the United States. Now, outside of the "16 words" I don't really remember how hard the Bush administration tried to sell the nuclear threat, but as Matt Yglesias points out, the real selling point of the war was that Saddam's weapons would be used against US civilians. On this point there was good reason to doubt the administration's claims, since inspectors found minimal evidence that Saddam had any capacity to deliver weapons beyond a range of 600 miles. Hans Blix's January 2003 testimony suggested the possible presence of a modest amount of chemical and biological agents, but no means to attack the US directly with them, while this October 2003 testimony on the Iraq Survey Group's work shows little evidence of any WMD and no way of delivering any payload beyond 1000 kilometers. While missles with a range longer than 110 kilometers did violate the terms of Saddam's disarmament, they could easily have been destroyed without invading the country.

I'm all for being honest about history; we should admit that the pro-war Democrats bought into much of the WMD hype. But they didn't buy into all of it, and lumping Saddam's ground-war-ready chemical weapons (which lots of people agreed on) with the hype of mushroom clouds over Saint Louis (where there was considerable public disagreement) conflates too many distinct forms of "weapons of mass destruction".

October 22, 2005

Incompetence Dodges, Flip-Flops, and Other Political Dance Moves

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Sam and Matt say that it’s wrong to cast the Iraq war as a good idea ruined by Bush administration incompetence. They’re right about this – clear thinking about the deep ethnic divisions in Iraq, our insufficient troop deployment, and the difficulty of instituting democracy at gunpoint should have convinced intelligent observers that invading Iraq would be a very bad idea. I’d add that the opportunity costs of invasion – in terms of the good that could have been done with those hundreds of billions of dollars and the American military (stopping the genocide in Sudan, perhaps?) ought to be reckoned into the calculus as well. I hope their piece forces unrepentant liberal-hawk commentators to drop their bad arguments and face responsibility. However, a whole different set of issues come into play when we talk about the positions that Democratic politicians should adopt.

Continue reading "Incompetence Dodges, Flip-Flops, and Other Political Dance Moves" »

October 16, 2005

Iraq the Muddle

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

It looks like the Iraqi Constitution is going to barely meet the requirements for passage -- majority support overall, and 1/3 support in at least 15 of the 18 provinces. I wish I could hope that this is a hopeful sign. The Sunnis came out fairly strongly against it, and it's unclear that they'll regard this as an election justly lost. And after reading the article that Kevin Drum linked about Shi'ites entering the Iraqi army for purpose of slaughtering Sunnis, it's hard to feel good about the future of interfaith relations in Iraq.

My guess is that the majority of Americans still see Iraqi Muslims more or less as an cohesive ethnoreligious unit, and not as a strife-torn collection of Sunnis, Shi'ites, Kurds, and Turkomen. I'm pretty confident that this misperception will all-too slowly change, as so many false beliefs about Iraq have. It's this misperception of Iraqi unity that permits the president's "As Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down" nonsense. What if it's a bunch of Shi'ites who stand up, proudly donning Iraqi Army uniforms, and rushing off to kill some Sunnis? And as for leaving when the elected government tells us to -- what if the elected Shi'ite government encourages us to stay and make sure the Sunnis whom they've cut out of the oil wealth don't cause any trouble?

Continue reading "Iraq the Muddle" »

October 15, 2005

Cross Your Purple Fingers

By Pepper of the Daily Pepper Today's vote on the Iraqi constitution happened with minimal violence. At least one critical day has passed without crowds of people dying. Even though the counting just started, we're likely going to see waves of Purple Finger Photos as the administration trumpets the referendum's success.

But Just Another Bump in the Beltway points to the WaPo:

The document they will ratify or reject shifts crucial decisions about government, the judiciary and human rights to a future national assembly, and it may itself be rewritten in the first half of next year. Though planned as a landmark in Iraq's postwar reconstruction -- and still described that way by the Bush administration -- the referendum has been stripped of much of its substance.

What are the Iraqis voting for anyway? On this blog, I have stated my serious issues with the constitution, and the constitution will soon be molded like a lump of clay whether people vote yes or no. It seems slightly odd that an administration with such a determination to place strict readers of the constitution on the high court is endorsing a constitutional process that essentially leaves everything up in the air.

On PBS' "NewsHour," Juan Cole was there to critique the constitution, but others on the panel endorsed it, not because of the constitution itself but because it was important to get the Iraqis used to the democratic process. Is the referendum damaged goods? Or is the act of voting more important than what's being voted on? I feel conflicted in this regard, especially after an American election in which "Vote or Die!" was a major slogan. Americans often don't get off their cans to vote, but isn't the subject matter of the voting just as important?

September 30, 2005

Strategic Redeployment

Over at CAP, Larry Korb and Brian Katulis have released a new plan for withdrawal from Iraq, what they call Strategic Redeployment. The plan itself is well presented, fairly intuitive stuff. During Bush's tenure terror attacks have increased, Iraq has gotten worse, our allies have been bombed, and all the rest. From there, it should be clear that the current strategy isn't working, a new approach is needed. Hence, redeployment rather than withdrawal. Korb's plan is presented as a way to enhance our effectiveness in the War on Terror by changing our troop focus and mission priorities, an approach that strikes me as a smart cooption of Bush's conflation of Iraq with the War on Terror. The redeployment itself would:

• Take 80,000 troops out of Iraq during 2006;

• Demobilize all Guard and Reserve troops so they could focus on Homeland Security;

• Take two active brigades (which means up to 20,000 troops) and use them as reinforcements for Afghanistan and African/Asian counterterrorism operations;

• And put the remaining 14,000 troops in Kuwait and nearby marine bases to strike at terrorist camps in the area and guard against further destabilizing threats to the region.

There's a bit more about communication strategies and reconstruction efforts and better diplomatic initiatives, but that's the nut. What I like about this plan, though, comes in the title. The emphasis on redeployment strikes me as a very savvy resolution to the prime conundrum of those advocating for withdrawal. The American people don't much like losing, retreat, defeat. And withdrawal, while they might agree with it in theory, can easily be spun as one of those nastier heuristics. Redeployment, however, grabs Bush's merging of Iraq and the War on Terror to argue that we need a focus shift, which is exactly the sort of thing you're supposed to do while enmeshed in enduring warfare. That Iraq had made us less safe is an easy case to argue, but when the alternative is a simple return home the discussion gets trickier. When the alternative, as it is here, is a redeployment into formations and positions that'll better protect against terrorism and let us back off from this fruitless war in Iraq, well, Democrats are on stronger ground.

September 25, 2005

Ask a Werewolf: Iraq and Terrorism

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Sometimes werewolves get letters from Democratic Senators. Other times, they don't. The following is a letter I didn't get, but the answer, below the fold, is something I did write.


Dear Werewolf,
I'd like to earn some respect from the Democratic base for criticizing Bush's war in a way that other Senators haven't. However, I don't have the guts to call for withdrawal from Iraq, and I want my criticism to be something that most Americans already agree with. What should I say?

--No Guts, Some Glory (D-Somewhere)

Continue reading "Ask a Werewolf: Iraq and Terrorism" »

September 14, 2005

No Good Options

A suicide bomber detonated himself in a crowd of Shiites today, shredding more 80 people and wounding 150 others. Elsewhere, gunmen dragged 17 people out of their homes in Taji, killing them on their stoops. All this on top a few mortar blasts, some shootings, carjackings ending in gunshot deaths, and all the rest of the Hobbesian chaos "freedom" has brought.

We can't win if we can't stop this. And we can't, it seems, stop this. So long as our forces fail to secure the country, we will be failed occupiers, not heralds of civic utopia. And so long as we can't secure this country, the men and woman within it will want us out, if for no other reason than because a change might, might calm the random killings. And even if our absence didn't bring peace in its vacuum, the shiites, freed from our direction, could launch war against the Sunnis, a response that'd at least erase the feeling of powerlessness in the face of constant assaults. And so President Talabani, while grinning and promising he'd never accept a timetable, widens his grin and happily says the US can withdraw 40,000 or 50,000 troops by the end of the year. It's time for you to go. We have to deal with this.

Iraq's in a bad way now. And I don't know what to do about it. I don't believe our presence there is making anything better. Indeed, I think we're making it worse. But I don't believe withdrawal will sprinkle fairy dust on Baghdad and turn the place into an Arab "It's a Small World" either. We've fucked up, we've fucked this country up, and while we can slowly tiptoe away, they can't.

September 11, 2005

Slashing America's Tires

By Ezra

Matt's post on asymmetric warfare in Iraq should really be read, maybe not so much by all of you, but by any strong supporters of the war who happen along this site. I'm not entirely sure why this is, but the knowledge that the insurgency fights differently has not quite connected to the idea that we're not fighting well, that our tactics need to change, that this is a fight we can't militarily win.

Asymmetric warfare, for those who don't know, is a military term for conflicts in which the antagonists have hugely mismatched combat capabilities. Therefore, the whole game of it, particularly for the weaker belligerent, is to not have their weaknesses match up with our strengths. That would be symmetrical warfare and they'd be crushed. That's what the insurgency isn't doing and it's why, when we try and fight them, as with the invasion of Baghdad, the overrun of Fallujah, or the assault on Tal Afar, they "melt away", refusing to fight and instead regrouping to hit later. Think of it like this: imagine you have the fastest car on the planet. Imagine you like to race people. Is anyone going to race you? No. But let's say your winning races would still be a negative outcome for them. So instead, every time you're in class or have your back turned, they slash your tires, poor sand in your tank, cut your brakes.

That's asymmetric warfare, you can beat them in a race, but they can disable your car. And that's what we're dealing with in Iraq. Because the enemy knows our strength, they refuse to face us, because they refuse to face us, we can't kill them, because we can't kill them, they can keep launching attacks on us, and because they can keep launching attacks on us, we keep trying to find ground where we can face them, but because the enemy knows our strength, they refuse to face us...

September 9, 2005

State of Iraq

The NY Times has released their new State of Iraq chart and oh what little difference a year makes. This one compares across Augusts (so August 03, August 04, August 05) on a variety of markers. Some of the findings:

• Of the three Augusts, 05 was the deadliest for US troops. Last month had 90 fatalities, 25 more than August 04, which in turn had 29 more than August 03. Major combat operations might be over on our side, but the insurgency is ramping right up.

• Happily, the number of troops wounded dropped significantly, 283 fewer than in August 2004, but August 2004 had 710 more than August 2003, so we're nowhere near post-war levels.

• Things are, as expected, getting worse for Iraqi civilians. August 05 had 600 being killed, a year before the number was 550, a year before that only 225.

• Estimated foreign jihadists is shooting up -- 100 in 03, 500 in 04, 900 now.

• Oil production is still 300,000 barrels below pre-war levels, but the GDP has increased above 2002's number. I'd like to know more about why that is, though -- how much of that is American-based reconstruction and how much is sustainable?

• The unemployment rate has dropped to 33%, though another way to say that is the unemployment rate is at 33%. If we want stability in Iraq, we're going to have to push that way down.

• About half the country's sewage is being treated (a marked improvement over past years), but significantly less electricity is available compared to 2004.

• There are more trained judges and Iraqi security forces than we've seen before.

Our delivery of basic services is, in some areas, marginally better, and in many others, a bit worse. More Americans are dying, more Iraqis are dying, there's less confidence in the government, less confidence in the country, more effective insurgent attacks, and a serious uptick in foreign jihadists. We're making some progress on training Iraqis to take over, but the country they're inheriting looks to be a mess. And for those who say we should remain until it's no longer a mess, I have to wonder why the steady deterioration with each extra year we remain there doesn't dishearten you some. While it looks like we're doing some good work on training/infrastructure issues, our security forces have been totally incapable of keeping the situation from degenerating.

August 27, 2005

Knocking Down Domino Theory

By Ezra

Robert Farley does a bang-up job of, well, banging up domino theory today, and I'm glad to see him doing it.  From Ben Stein's insane editorials after Deep Throat revealed himself to Peggy Noonan's odd pivot at the end of the first chapter of her memoirs, the essential rightness of domino theory keeps popping up among right-wing "intellectuals" as proof of the left's basic naiveté and idiocy.  It shouldn't.  Domino theory is the sort of supratheory used as trump card by those who want to justify war when the conflict itself is unjustified.  It also, helpfully, lets them argue for indefinite warfare, even when our continued presence would render our immediate objectives harder to attain and do enormous damage to us, our enemies, and all civilians unlucky enough to become collateral.  That's the sort of theory that deserves extra-super-special scrutiny and domino theory, as it stands, doesn't hold up.

The threat in domino theory, of course, was that American weakness anywhere would embolden our enemies everywhere.  Proponents of it think that's what happened in Vietnam.  It isn't.  But now, those same, completely incorrect folks folks have gotten us into the domino theory downside in Iraq.  Well done!

Continue reading "Knocking Down Domino Theory" »

Nice Country You Have Here...Shame If Anything Should Happen To It

So how's that Iraqi Constitution going? Well, glad you asked...

Sunni Arab political leaders condemned a draft of Iraq's proposed constitution handed to them on Saturday, saying it was unlikely that they would approve the document and that it could provoke even more violence. And they scrambled to arrange meetings to revise the document even as Shiite and Kurdish leaders insisted that it would be published without substantial changes.
...
"We still have some hope that we could reach something," said Saleh Mutlak, a leading Sunni member of the constitutional committee, referring to the ongoing struggles to reach agreement with his Shiite and Kurdish colleagues.
"If we reach it, fair enough. If we don't, then they have to take responsibility for what happens if this constitution is passed."

Asked what the consequences of such a rupture might be, Mr. Mutlak said: "The violence will go up, the hope among the people will go down. And the extremists will be the ones who are in control of the country."

The italics, of course, are mine. What's interesting here, aside from the roadmap to oblivion that's being laid out, is the Sunni's frank admission that the cost of an unwelcome constitution will be a lot of lives. We're not dealing, at least publicly, with a Sunni establishment that wants peaceful compromise and a Sunni insurgency that wants to detonate the country, we're dealing with a scared minority entirely willing to launch a long-term, low-grade guerrilla war to eventually achieve the outcomes they seek. And since neither the Kurds nor the Shi'ites are willing to write the constitution that the Sunnis want, I don't really see how you prevent a nationalist Sunni insurgency from existing well into the future.

A week or two ago, I compared Iraq's drafting of the constitution to the Founding Fathers attempting the same thing, except with newly freed and politically empowered Blacks and Native-Americans fielding representatives in the room. I think I was mostly right, save for one thing. I forgot to mention that the Blacks are heavily, heavily armed.

August 25, 2005

The Politics of Withdrawal

Armando and Jerome are talking about the politics of withdrawal, which is about where my mind has settled recently. For all the reasons I've laid out, and for all the better reasons others have laid out, I'm firmly convinced that our continued, indefinite presence in the country achieves absolutely nothing. On the other hand, I'm similarly certain that an inept or overly fatalist call for withdrawal will be marketed to the American people as retreat, and retreat is not the sort of sentiment that wins elections.

Yeah, that's craven, but once you know what you want to do, you have to think about how it sells. Americans aren't particularly pleased with the war, but nor are they ever willing to vote for a loss. If Democrats stand on one side of the stage and talk about our unwinnable quagmire and Republicans stand on the other and explain how, yes, mistakes were made, but we can still finish the job, and General Know-Nothing says we're just a few months from completion and can't turn away now, I think the Republican will win. Not everywhere, but in the close districts where we need to pickup support. And I think that because we've seen this before. We've seen it in Vietnam, but hell, the dynamic goes back to the war of 1812. The antiwar position has never been an electoral winner and I see no reason to believe it's become one now.

Continue reading "The Politics of Withdrawal" »

August 22, 2005

Freedom Marching Backwards -- Quickly

Sez Logan:

It’d be as if massive stockpiles of WMD were found being loaded onto bombers the day we invaded, and then Iraq spontaneously erupted into a libertarian utopia and I were standing here waving my finger in the air, shouting, “It still wasn’t worth it!”

Who is he talking about? What is he referring to? Go here. Why, whenever I read the latest pronouncements from these hacks, can I only think of Iraq's former information minister promising that our armies were retreating as Baghdad fell? Why indeed...

Russ Makes Sense

I think this exchange between [host] David Gregory and Russ Feingold on this week's Meet the Press does a very good job of exposing the basic incoherence of the withdrawal-means-the-terrorists-have-already-won position:

MR. GREGORY: Not only has the president said that any kind of deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops is a mistake, but so have prominent members of your own party... Senator Hillary Clinton this February, the headline: "Hillary Rejects Deadline." "I don't think we should be setting a deadline. ...That just gives a green light to the insurgents and the terrorists, that if they just wait us out they can basically have the country. It's not in our interest, given the sacrifices we have made."

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, of course, I haven't proposed a deadline. But, you know, the Democrats are making the same mistake they made in 2002, to let the administration intimidate them into not opposing this war, when so many of us knew it wasn't a good idea. And same thing with this taboo on talking about a timeline. It doesn't make sense. If the terrorists and the insurgents really thought that, why wouldn't they just stop blowing us up right now? Why wouldn't they just let us leave and then take over?

Russ is absolutely right. If the insurgency's aim was to eject us from Iraq so they could take over in our absence (though I've yet to see how they plan to do that), they wouldn't be hardening the Pharaoh's heart through bombings and IED's, they'd be laying quiet, letting things go smoothly so we'd pack up and go home and they could suit up and conquer their home.

I'd love to hear Hillary Clinton explain how the insurgents are going to go about having the country after our departure. The Iraqi constitution is being bogged down because Sunnis want access to the oil-rich areas within the Shi'ite territory. Do the math: the country is overwhelmingly Shi'ite, the oil is deep within the region they control, and the Sunnis need some of those profits to survive. So exactly how is this insurgency, which is being carried out by a fraction of a minority, going to overrun the country? And if their actions simply enrage the Shi'ites, as they will, doesn't it make sense that the rest of the Sunnis, who hold no demographic or economic cards, will be desperate for rapprochement and begin quelling the extremists in their own ranks?

So long as we're there, there's a buffer between the Iraqi people and those trying to destroy them. The insurgents may not be liked, but their actions can be rationalized as anti-imperialist warfare. Once we leave, they can't. Once we leave, the Sunnis need to figure out what strategies will put them in a sustainable position. Considering their percentage of the population and their geographic location, a rupture with the Shi'ites isn't going to survive that analysis.

August 21, 2005

Points of Contention

By Ezra

I've not been terribly pleased with the press's coverage of the Iraqi constitution delays, so tonight I did a think tank trawl trying to find something better. Best article? Nathan Brown's, over at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. According to him, It seems to be widely acknowledged, at least in the Iraqi press, that there are 18 points of contention. These are:

1. The name of Iraq [whether to describe it as federal and/or Islamic]
2. Religion [the precise formula by which the Islamic shari‘a will be described as a
source of law]
3. The constituent elements of the Iraqi people [whether various groups in Iraqi
society should be named and, if so, which ones]
4. Language [whether Kurdish should be co-equal with Arabic or official only in the
Kurdish region; the status of other languages]
5. Identity of Iraq [whether and how Iraq is described as Arab and Islamic]
6. The marja‘iyya [Shi‘i religious authority and whether it should be mentioned in
the constitution]
7. Holy places [The word used (‘atabat) generally refers to Shi‘i holy places]
8. The president of the republic [whether to make the position purely ceremonial or
allow it to have some executive responsibilities; the number of vice-presidents]
9. Ministers [whether ministers can or must also serve as members of parliament]
10. Matters related to natural resources [the distribution of oil revenues among
various levels of government]
11. Personal status [family law—whether it will be governed by a single legislated
code or whether it will be applied according to the sect of the litigants]
12. Voluntary union and the right of self-determination [a reference to a Kurdish
demand that the federation be described as voluntary and that the Kurdish right of
self-determination be affirmed]
13. [omitted from list; other versions of this list include the division of executive
authorities between the president and the prime minister on this point]
14. Dual citizenship [Whether it should be allowed for ordinary citizens and for high
officials]
15. The city of Kirkuk [Kurdish parties wish to have the procedure mentioned in
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law affirmed and implementation
to begin immediately]
16. The borders of the Kurdistan region
17. Parliament [whether an upper house should be constructed with representation by
province and/or region]
18. The Transitional Administrative Law [whether its validity will be explicitly—if
somewhat retroactively—affirmed]

That's a fairly extensive list. On the bright side, various issues are at various stages of completion -- they're not all intractable conflicts stuck at the first step. Some of them, like whether MP's must be ministers, are fairly technical problems, while others, like the division of oil revenues and the articulated nature of the country, are quite a bit trickier. In the end, it comes down to federalism and power-sharing. The Kurds are happy with their current, semi-autonomous region, the Sunnis are afraid the Shi'ites will subject them to the same oppressive treatment that they they spent the last few decades imposing on the country, and the Shi'ites don't want their long-delayed return to power weakened by niceties and loopholes demanded by a deposed, fearful minority. All in all, an agreement isn't impossible, but neither is it looking likely. Brown's article, at least, helps explain why.

August 20, 2005

Withdrawal-lite

By Ezra

Brad Plumer, in answer to last week's question du jour, makes a fairly convincing case against timed withdrawal. Read it. It remains my position, though, that there's a softer form withdrawal can take, one that I think would carry most of its assumed benefits and few of a timetable's weaknesses. If we publicly disavowed bases, loudly proclaimed our intention to leave as soon as the Iraqi government and security forces was complete, and created a timed drawdown in troop strength, much of what we want withdrawal to prove might actually get across without a full abandonment of the project.

We should, at this point, have a general idea of how quickly the Iraqi army is coming online. If we tagged the withdrawal of the first, say, 10,000 troops to the date when we thought there'd be 20,000 (or whatever) Iraqi troops to replace them, we could create the symbolic first step towards withdrawal without seriously losing troop strength in the country. If we then kept doing that, bit by bit, we could gradually disengage,, though do it in a flexible way that leaves us able to recommit if the situation begins to worsen. In any case, it seems clear that we need to convince both average Iraqis and a certain subsection of insurgents that we don't have long-term, imperialist designs on the country, and the sooner we do that, the better things get.

On another note, whatever happened to Moqtada al-Sadr? I haven't heard much about him lately.

August 19, 2005

We Don't Do Perfect

Matt, in a post about how Kevin Drum echoes his thinking on Iraq, pens a terrific explanation of where I've landed in recent months:

That said, I've sort of been shifting away from the "had no chance of working even if it had been competently executed" view in favor of a more sophisticated one. Here's how I would put it. In Iceland, they often need to close a road or two to traffic because it's too dangerous. That doesn't mean it would be literally impossible to drive safely across it. If you drove perfectly, you could probably make it. But the road is closed precisely because it's so rare for someone to drive perfectly in difficult conditions. A dangerous undertaking that can only be done successfully if you never make a mistake, is something you ought to avoid doing. After all, it's not as if the United States won the second world war, or the civil war, because our strategy was flawlessly executed. There were plenty of mistakes and errors along the way. There are always mistakes and errors in such a large undertaking as a war. Which is precisely why there should be a strong presumption against undertaking wars of choice. It's a distinctively liberal error to think "massive, flawlessly executed government-sponsored venture" is a real option to be put aside "don't do it" and "do it but make some mistakes." Mistakes, when made, should of course be criticized, but on side level some mistakes are inevitable. If your plan depends on the absence of errors, then you've got a bad plan.

This is one of those long-time, historically recurring mistakes liberals make. From the Kennedy Brothers' deification of CIA operatives, which led to the Bay of Pigs, to the liberal hawk's reliance on Kenneth Pollack's smiley, heroic vision of an Iraq occupation, we get this wrong a lot. Indeed, the only time I can think of it working, or even coming close, is in Kosovo, where our military strategy was idiotic and took us months longer than it should have, but our mistakes were on the side of caution and thus our own ranks remained blissfully unthinned (the Kosovars experienced no such luck). But in Iraq, our mistakes were all strikes against prudence, and so the casualty count and emotional immediacy of the many missteps and strategic failures proved much higher.

Continue reading "We Don't Do Perfect" »

August 18, 2005

What Is Success?

So here's my question for those who oppose conditional withdrawal from Iraq: what is success? We're there now, we will, someday in the future, not be there. What is gained through prolonging the interim period? All I ever hear is that we must "finish the job", "win the peace", "not cut and run", and do a variety of other platitudinous things that don't tell me anything.

So when is the job finished? When is the peace won? Do you think we'll somehow crush the insurgency, all evidence of the last few years to the contrary? Will Iraq solve its ethnic conflicts if the US just looks over its shoulder long enough? Assuming we don't set conditions for withdrawal and just remain indefinitely, what are we looking for that'll allow us to wake up one day, judge the war a success, and mosey on back home to ticket tape parades?

This is a serious question. And I'd like some serious, thoughtful answers. I don't want to hear from withdrawal supporters telling me how hopeless the situation is, I want to hear those who think we should stay articulate what we're staying for, what the expended lives and treasure will gain, what conditions will prove the war a success. And then, when that's done, I'd like to know how making those same conditions the conditions for withdrawal would render them less achievable. The pro argument for withdrawal is generally that conditions would give the Iraqis something concrete to work towards and split off the nationalist, anti-American insurgency from the inter-ethnic, tribal insurgency. But we've heard all about that lately -- hell, even Chuck Hagel's saying it. Now I want to hear the best arguments from the other side.

Sea Change

The New York Times today has a long article on Republican discomfort over the worsening situation in Iraq. Quoth Grover:

Grover Norquist, a conservative activist with close ties to the White House and Mr. Bush's senior adviser, Karl Rove, said: "If Iraq is in the rearview mirror in the '06 election, the Republicans will do fine. But if it's still in the windshield, there are problems."

It gets worse:

Pollsters and political analysts pointed to basic opinion shifts that accounted for the political change. Daniel Yankelovich, a pollster who has been studying American attitudes on foreign affairs, said: "I think what's changed over the last year is the assumption that Iraq would make us safer from terrorists to wondering if that actually is the case. And maybe it's the opposite."

Richard A. Viguerie, a veteran conservative direct-mail consultant, said Mr. Bush "turned the volume up on his megaphone about as high as it could go to try to tie the war in Iraq to the war on terrorism" last year, and he argued that the White House could no longer do that.

It's clear that the last couple of weeks have witnessed a sea change in perceptions over Iraq. While it had long been clear that things weren't going great, every day that passed in August seemed to pound in the realization that it wasn't going at all, that anti-war sentiment had become a serious force, that former hawks had become current doves, elite supporters were now respected detractors, and the President's assurances were no longer worth a damn. Cindy Sheehan is part of that, as are new books by Larry Diamond and Anthony Shadid, worsening poll numbers, the unmet constitution deadline, and all the rest of the bad news flowing from the country.

Now Russ Feingold, a major Democrat, is calling for withdrawal, so expect him to become part of the chorus as well, adding to the critical mass of legitimacy anti-war sentiment is now gathering. The question then becomes what happens in the rest of the Democratic party. Do the so-called "serious candidates" try to marginalize this sentiment, consigning it to an ever-angrier, and ever-larger minority that threatens to tear the party apart? Or do they begin to embrace it, making it a politically safe and mainstream opinion? At this point, the success of this moment is largely up to them.

August 17, 2005

1787 With Fewer White People

Harold Meyerson has a very good op-ed on Iraq in today's Washington Post:

It looks increasingly as if President Bush may have been off by 74 years in his assessment of Iraq. By deposing the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, Bush assumed he would bring Iraq to its 1787 moment -- the crafting of a democratic constitution, the birth of a unified republic. Instead, he seems to have brought Iraq to the brink of its own 1861 -- the moment of national dissolution.

It's true. I was thinking about this the other day: we like to imagine Iraq's current Constitutional Convention as an analogue, at least of sorts, to the one attended by our own Founding Fathers. But that's a bit off the mark. It's more as if our Found Fathers had to also deal with powerful, represented contingents of newly freed black slaves and politically empowered Native Americans. Could they do it?

It's one thing to create a democratic republic of basically similar white people, but quite another to deal with ethnic groups who you've traditionally subjugated (or have traditionally subjugated you) and apportion the country in such a way that your dominance is accepted by their leaders. That's what Iraq is going through right now. And, thinking about it, I gotta say: even with the deification of Jefferson, Adams and all the rest, my wildly inflated opinion of the group still doesn't think they could've figured this one out. But then, I'm no longer particularly convinced this one can be figured out. If I'm wrong, however, and Iraq does have a happy ending, their "Founding Fathers" are going to deserve some damn fine plaques in recognition.

August 16, 2005

Iraq

In conversation yesterday, Sam Rosenfeld made a really good point. The American Prospect's full-court press against unrepentant liberal hawks doesn't need to have a political component to it: there'll be endless hours of electoral strategizing as the midterms draw closer. For now, we should be eschewing that and having the sort of serious conversation about the war and our response to it that elections don't allow.

But what worries me is that, instead of that discussion, we're going to have our old one over again. As Sam points out and Atrios approvingly links to, the hawks were wrong. And yes, pace both of them, the hawks should know they were wrong, and say so publicly. And, in concert with the Prospect's new cover story, many pundits were irresponsible and they should shoulder much of the blame. And, as Ari Berman says, our think-tankin' class has proven themselves desperate to attain neocon "seriousness" and crowded around this chance to support a war like fat kids salivating over birthday cake. So yes, there's plenty of blame to go around.

But the really pressing issue facing liberals now isn't whether or not we can compel mea culpas, it's what comes next. Not what comes next politically, but what should Democrats and/or liberals be thinking about the War in Iraq on a policy level? Should there be an immediate withdrawal with admission of wrongdoing? If so, how is the peace kept? Are there reparations, or just an apology? Or should there be a promised withdrawal with conditions? How about a timetable? What about a Bidenesque (and, for that matter, Deanesque, at least during the campaign) buildup in troop levels? Is this salvageable, and if not, is that the consequence of mismanagement, or is it endemic to all similar projects and a lesson that needs to guide our future foreign policy thinking?

Continue reading "Iraq" »

August 15, 2005

Smokey Says...

I sure hope those hawks who've recently been pushing the "civil wars are like forest fires: healthy, regenerative, natural, necessary for long-term growth" know what they're talking about, as it looks like Iraqi leaders left their campfire burning last night:

With several questions unresolved, Shiite leaders said Sunday that they were considering asking the National Assembly to approve the document without the agreement of the country's Sunni leaders. Such a move would probably provoke the Sunnis, whose participation in the political process is seen as crucial in the effort to marginalize the Sunni-dominated guerrilla insurgency.
...
The negotiations were stalled on a number of issues, including the role of Islam in the state, the rights of women and the distribution of power between central and regional governments. Issues that had seemed to have been settled, like the sharing of oil revenues, came unraveled.

You know, with Iraq sprinting towards total disaster, I'm genuinely unsure if I should be scared or comforted that our president is spending his time at little league games. On the one hand, you'd think this is the sort of thing he should be working to solve. On the other, counting the buck-toothed kid's RBIs might keep him from screwing up Iraq any more than he already has.

August 13, 2005

Regime Change in Baghdad

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

Ezra has already mentioned the bizarre events that took place in Baghdad on Monday.  A bunch of armed Shiite militiamen entered Baghdad's municipal building, deposed the mayor, and installed their own guy in office.  The deposed mayor is unharmed -- apparently he wasn't in the building at the time -- but he has officially resigned, and he's fleeing the country. 

There's a bunch of things to be said about this.  How well can we be doing in providing security when thugs can just march into City Hall, kick out the old mayor, and install a new one?  How can you have a stable democracy when anybody with enough guns can put whoever they want into power?  How can we convince Sunnis to buy into the new Iraqi government when Shiites are using weapons to put people into office?  But the thing I really want to address is the way that this shows the error of so much right-wing talk about regime change. 

Continue reading "Regime Change in Baghdad" »

August 12, 2005

The Mystery of the Missing Spokesperson

I think I should say a bit more about the Gary Hart piece I plugged yesterday. What's interesting here isn't his skewering of the Bush administration or his lionization of Cindy Sheehan, but his diagnosis of what's wrong with the antiwar movement today:

where will the expanding majority of Americans look for a representative, a spokesperson, a voice for their anger, frustration, and distrust at being misled?

The circumstances suggest it should be a Senate or House Democratic leader, a recognized authority on foreign policy constantly seen on the Sunday talk shows, certainly one of the many “leaders” lining up to seek the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in 2008.

Strangely, no one in any of those categories comes to mind. Their voices are silent.

He's right. And it's strange. For some reason, no William Fulbright has emerged, no George McGovern or Eugene McCarthy or RFK has stepped forward to focus the call for withdrawal. We've got this big rally, and most of America has joined, but there's not a goddamn soul on the stage. One could argue that Dean was on his way to leadership, but his campaign called for an expansion of the troop presence, his anti-war position was anti starting the war, not continuing it. In any case, he no longer has the sort of rhetorical freedom to make those comments, his leash has been tightened.

Continue reading "The Mystery of the Missing Spokesperson" »

August 9, 2005

Squandered Communications Strategies

What always leaves me a bit shocked with the Bush administration's handling of Iraq is how unwilling they are to pursue courses of obvious political and military worth. Nobody in the White House thinks this war is playing well in the country, none of them are missing the polls or being blinded to the attitude shift. Back in the day, Don Rumsfeld's "behinder" memo proved he understood what was happening on the ground. And yet, aside from some weird leaks here and there, there's no effort to assure Americans that we have strategy for leaving, no move to convince Iraqis that we don't want to stay, and no sign that the Administration even knows what it's objective is.

Larry Diamond, the Stanford democracy advisor who returned from Iraq and wrote Squandered Victory, is doing a book club over at TPM Cafe. His suggestions for the Bush administration had been a public disavowal of long-term designs (i.e, no 14 permanent military bases), a timetable for withdrawal tied to certain benchmarks in the Iraqi government, and a multilateral nation-building effort. But the Bush administration circled option "d", none of the above, and our troops are paying for it.

It's such a strange abdication, though. Why wouldn't we have a set of guidelines detailing what a stable Iraq would look like and at which point it'd cease to need us? Why would we even want permanent bases in the chaotic country, knowing the rage and violence that our long-term presence in Saudi Arabia provoked? That is, after all, what gave rise to bin-Laden.

So what's the end game here? Is the Bush administration simply too stubborn to accept advice that originates outside their walls, or is there some genuine objective, some next step, that they're waiting for and we're unaware of? As things stand now, though, things doesn't make sense. The Mayberry Machiavellis are better wind readers than this.

July 14, 2005

Pronunciation

How do you pronounce "Iraq"?  Specifically, how do you pronounce the last syllable?  Is it "Rack"  or something closer to "Rock"?  (If you pronounce the vowel like the a in "father", I'll put you on the "Rock" team -- I think that's closer to the short "o" than to the short "a".)

George W. Bush, as we know, says "Rack."  I was just thinking that people used to pronounce it differently before he became President.  Sure enough, Bill Clinton said "Rock."  Linguist Geoff Nunberg avers that "Rock" is slightly closer to the correct pronunciation (he says it's rawq).  My sense is that "Rack" is much more common in the media today, though I only rarely watch TV, so I could be wrong. 

I'm curious to see how this transition took place.  It'd be really interesting if the Fox News people switched their pronunciation to cover Bush, and the rest of the media followed suit. 

--Neil the Ethical Werewolf

June 30, 2005

Good News, Bad News

See if you can find which is which:

For the first time since January, the Army met its monthly recruiting goal in June, but still faces what some senior Army officials say is a nearly insurmountable shortfall to meet the service's annual quota.
...
But that still leaves the active-duty Army about 7,800 recruits behind schedule to send 80,000 enlistees to boot camp with only three months to go in the recruiting year, which ends on Sept. 30. The Army has not missed its annual enlistment quota since 1999, when a strong economy made recruiters' lives miserable.

Army officials insist that they can still reach their annual goal, especially with hundreds of new recruiters on the street, armed with big enlistment bonuses and greater leeway to recruit more high-school dropouts and lower-achieving applicants.

First time since January. That's not good. Moreover, I'm a bit nervous about our new strategy of attracting the most hopeless, directionless, and uneducated recruits we can find. When "a few bad apples"* can do as much harm to the cause as the bushel running Abu Ghraib did, it kind of underscores the need for a military representing the best of our society, not one formed by trawling the bottom of Lake America and enlisting whatever floats up.

* Abu Ghraib, of course, was not the work of a few bad apples, but a host of bad directives, poor leaders, inadequate oversight, and so forth. Nevertheless, since conservatives seem to think we really do have an Army of Ones, they should be fairly nervous about recruiting individuals who the Army, mere months ago, would've rejected out of hand.

Dangerous Incompetence

This is Matthew Holt again. I still owe you all history of why Clinton's health reform went down, so Ezra let me stay as a guest poster. I hope he doesn't mind me posting this but Bob Herbert's column about the incompetence of Bushco in Iraq is beautiful, if tragic. And this line about Bush's desire for the Iraqis to take over from our troops is the best description ever of the mentality of the clowns running this country.

"We've learned that Iraqis are courageous and that they need additional skills," said Mr. Bush in his television address. "And that is why a major part of our mission is to train them so they can do the fighting, and then our troops can come home."

Don't hold your breath. This is another example of the administration's inability to distinguish between a strategy and a wish.

June 28, 2005

Bush's Speech By The Numbers

So the speech. Didn't watch it. But, you'll be happy to know, the girlfriend and I had an excellent Italian dinner while it was going on. I win. Nevertheless, conscientious blogger that I am, I did give it a read through. Impressive it wasn't, but redundant it was. The nice thing about this group is that they're simple, when they try and manipulate you, they do it by repetition. So here you go, Bush's address by the numbers:

• "Terror" -- Used 5 times

• "Terrorist" -- 22 times;

• "Insurgents" -- 6 times;

• "Osama bin Laden" -- 2 times;

• "Zarqawi" -- 1 time;

• "September 11" -- 6 times;

• "Saddam Hussein" -- 1 time;

• "Free" -- 10 times;

• "Freedom" -- 18 times.

• "Weapons of mass destruction", "nuclear weapons", or other WMD references in context of Iraq -- 0 times;

• Weapon references in context of Libya -- 2 times.

Pretty much says it all, doesn't it? The WMD hysteria wasn't about Iraq but Lybia (mission accomplished!). Lots of freedom, a healthy sprinkling of 9/11, a weak insurgency, tons of terrorists, twice as much bin Laden as Zarqawi...that's the war the President's fighting. Which one were you talking about?

Update: Looks like Think Progress took a similar approach. This was my gig, dammit!

Update 2: Democracy Arsenal takes the trophy for best coverage. Plus, they're like, smart and stuff.

Herding Cats and Lacking Tasers

Matt's response to Derek Chollet's post warning against a Democratic timetable for withdrawal from Iraq is worth thinking seriously about:

I appreciate what Derek Chollet is getting at with his warning that advocacy of a nuanced timetablish withdrawal from Iraq could turn into a political fiasco for the Democrats. Still, the general form of argument he's making here is something I think liberals need to learn to leave aside. Of course if Democrats advocate the sort of Iraq policy I'd like to see they'll be portrayed by the White House as cowardly appeasers. But then again, there isn't some alternative policy that will cause the White House to respond, "well, that's a serious-minded and patriotic alternative vision that contrasts sharply with our slap-dash and maniacal efforts to run the country."

That strikes me as right. On the other hand, it's often misappropriated to argue that content doesn't matter, Americans will be accepting of anything so long as it's delivered with sufficient conviction and since Republicans will attack every policy we offer, none are better political bets than any others. Might as well give Dennis Kucinich a podium and win the the battle of certainty. So we need to be careful with that.

Democrats happen to have a highly competent foreign policy establishment able, on a fairly regular basis, to provide us with broadly supportable and widely appealing policy options. What we don't have is the party coherence to push them or the messaging capabilities to defend them. More than the Republicans, the Democratic party stretches across the full spectrum of foreign policy opinions, from Dennis Kucinich all the way to Joe Lieberman. And that's a problem.

Continue reading "Herding Cats and Lacking Tasers" »

June 19, 2005

Gird Your Loins

A few days ago, Kevin Drum was worried that pushing aggressively for a pullout from Iraq would get Democrats tarred as the party that lost the war. Kevin isn't arguing against pullout -- he spends much of the post attacking delusional people who think we can beseech the Troops Fairy for another 100,000 soldiers, and then acknowledges that withdrawing is all we can do. Only then does he go into Gloomy Kevin mode, bemoaning the evils that might befall us after the troops leave.

Fear not, O moderate Democrat, and hearken to the whirlwind that rides the Downing Street Memos. As the realization that we're in a quagmire develops outside the Democratic Party, we reach the moment when criticisms of the Bush Administration's non-planning for reconstruction will have maximum impact. (Thanks for the link, Shakespeare's Sister.) Now is the time to press -- the more intensely people are aware that Bush's lack a postwar plan saddled us with this dismal set of choices, the less likely it is that we'll meet criticism for taking the least bad option.

--Neil the Ethical Werewolf

May 22, 2005

The Islamic Republic -- Now With Nukes

Looks like talks with Iran are rapidly approaching their breaking point and the EU is murmuring about a security council referral. Hmm. You know, I'm kinda conflicted about this. On the one hand, I don't much want Iran to have a nuke. I'm not really of the mind that they'll do a handoff to Hezbollah, but then, the country is unstable and amid revolution lots of nasty things can be done by insane people, so all things considered, I'd prefer them nukeless.

On the other, Iran is really an interesting case of a country. We tend to group that whole region together as run by Islamofascists, but it's really not true. Only Iran and pre-invasion Afghanistan fit that, the rest of the countries are run by tyrants with an opportunistic relationship to Allah, not a real commitment to run their affairs off fatwa. But the Islamic Republic of Iran is, of course, very poorly run. Khomeini, who led the revolution, offered such vague rhetoric and soft plans that he united the professionals, the urban poor, the lower middle class, the technocrats, the leftists -- everyone thought they'd have a part in the product.

One revolution and a few purges later, folks know that the Islamic Republic isn't much interested in modernity beyond what it needs to give up to stay in power. So Iran's society has cracks, lots of them. And its leaders operate in the time-tested way of overwhelmed, underliked dictators -- they try to unite by manufacturing outside persecution. If we get Iran to the security council and slap sanctions on them or bomb a nuclear plant, we delay the day when the society needs to figure itself out and reconcile its own contradictions. And the sooner that comes, the sooner the Islamic Republic is, finally, discredited, not just in Iran but elsewhere.

Continue reading "The Islamic Republic -- Now With Nukes" »

May 19, 2005

Oh, And John Kerry Was a Flip-Flopper

In the middle of a sobering, grim article on Iraq's worsening prospects comes this bit of carefully placed, lovingly-crafted spin (italics mine):

Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top American officer in the Middle East, said in a briefing in Washington that one problem was the disappointing progress in developing Iraqi police units cohesive enough to mount an effective challenge to insurgents and allow American forces to begin stepping back from the fighting. General Abizaid, who speaks with President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld regularly, was in Washington this week for a meeting of regional commanders.

Sound familiar?  Like from every Bush administration press conference you've ever heard?  Yeah, I thought so too.  Gotta respect that sort of message discipline, coming as it is from New York Times reporters.  The rest of the article, however, is very good, and you should read it.  Looks like Iraq isn't prgressing as swimmingly as we'd hoped.

April 18, 2005

Marla Ruzicka

DHinMI's obituary for Marla Ruzicka, the aid worker murdered in Iraq yesterday, is an essential read, remembering her is the least we can do. Actually, that's not true, learning from her is the least we can do. Because Marla lived a lesson that many of us desperately need to learn. She understood that great good could come in the aftermath of great evil, and that the perpetrators of the latter could be your best allies in achieving the former.

Ruzicka was no fan of the war, that much is sure. But once it had been engaged, she saw that the chaos it left had to be filled with something more positive, more beneficial, more sound. And so she set about trying to actualize that, and did a hell of a job right up until her death. She enlisted all available allies, from NGO's to liberal organizations to the Senate right up to the US Army. No group, no matter how culpable, was off-limits in her quest to heal the country. And every group, no matter how culpable, joined her in her efforts.

The roadside bomb that killed her was a murder, a cold-blooded execution that lacked any moral justification whatsoever. Whether it was aimed at the troops who had no say in the decision to enter war or whether it was a simple strike meant to tear apart the fabric of normalcy, it was just one more of the insurgency's indiscriminate attacks. Shrapnel makes no differentiation between sinner and saint, and those who use it don't either, which makes them nothing but killers. And let that be the discussion on that.

After the war, Marla believed that the space Saddam needed to be filled. She brought together Americans and Iraqis, soldiers and civilians, and set about filling in the hole. And she worked on that project right up until her death. So if you want an indictment of the insurgency, here it is: they killed Marla Ruzicka. And if you want a reason for hope in Iraq, here's another: there was a Marla Ruzicka, and because of her, there will be more. Some will be American, some will be the Iraqis she personally touched, but there will be more. Marla Ruzicka may have been murdered yesterday, but those she met comprise her memorial and the example she set should serve as her epitaph. All we can do is try and follow.

April 4, 2005

Bush vs. Workers

The Bush administration is renewing, or at least redoubling, its assault on labor. Now organized unions will face more audits, tougher scrutiny, and a host of other small obstacles and shackles meant to distract them from representing their workers. This, of course, comes on the heels of the NLRB's decision to focus on card checks -- the universally accepted way to form a union -- and the Bush administration's intervention against a California law barring employers from using taxpayer funds to run antiunion campaign. Sirota's got the story.

March 29, 2005

End of the Investigation

Looks like we should consign that little part of us awaiting answers on the intelligence failures that led us into Iraq to that same purgatory where we still expect a verdict in the Plame case. It didn't have to be that way. Liberals weren't happy when Kansas Senator Pat Roberts condemned the intelligence verdict on the Bush administration to "Phase II", which would only emerge after the election, but still, we understood. Were we Republicans, tasked with defending a President who'd obviously massaged inadequate intelligence into the shape he wanted, we'd want the report to come out post-election as well.

But even I didn't think they'd just stonewall the thing. Even I didn't think they'd just bog down the investigation and let it fizzle out of its own accord. But that's exactly what Roberts has done. No administration officials have been interviewed, obstacles set up by the OSP (a bunch of neocons who seem responsible for much of the mess) have not been bypassed, and Roberts has declared the investigation "on the backburner", which ensures that it'll never singe Bush.

Checks and balances indeed.

March 12, 2005

A Talent for Torture

With many thanks to commenter Nick, I finally found that Jim Talent quote, and she's a doozy:

But a Republican panel member, Senator Jim Talent of Missouri, signaled that, as far as he is concerned, little if any blame rests on American shoulders. "If our guys want to poke somebody in the chest to get the name of a bombmaker so they can save the lives of Americans, I'm for it," Talent said, according to The Associated Press. "I don't need an investigation to tell me that there was no comprehensive or systematic use of inhumane tactics by the American military, because those guys and gals just wouldn't do it."

Set aside for a moment the fact that torture is wildly ineffective at procuring information. Set aside that 70-90% of those we tortured were non-combatant civilians. Set aside the fact that Iraqis knew about Abu Ghraib long before we did, and our failure to acknowledge and deal with it seriously only added fuel to the insurgency's fire. And certainly, set aside Talent's gut-wrenching reference to torture as a "poke in the chest," though I bet McCain loved that one.

What absolutely kills me here is this: Of course our military men and women would never institute a systematic program of torture. They wouldn't do it, because they understand that things like the Geneva conventions, and our respect for human rights in general, are what separate us from the enemy by more than a matter of degree. No, Sen. Talent, they'd never do that, but you know who would? The guy who you voted to make our Attorney General! Almost nothing that's gone wrong with this war has been the sole fault of the military. Gen. Shinseki knew we'd need more troops than we did, and we all know how that story goes. The story of our failures in Iraq can be hung on a timeline of civilian war planners putting the actual safety and effectiveness of our troops at Priority M or so. So, Jim, if you really believe in the goodness of our men and women in uniform - as I do - then what say you stop promoting the leaders that slander their good names with their ruthless incompetence? Or would that just be too much darn accountability for you to handle?

Incidentally, during his comments, I remember Talent saying something like, "I think this is what Sen. Lieberman was getting at." Indeed, it was:

A prominent Democrat on the committee, Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, agreed with Church's conclusion that the incidents of abuse, however deplorable, were few, at least in terms of statistics. "Seventy cases out of 50,000 detainees is about one-tenth of 1 percent," the senator said.

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

- Daniel A. Munz

February 28, 2005

But al-Qaqaa is so....Quaint

Brad Plumer, in a post on the nauseating Hilla bombing, notes that a car bomb has to be pretty fucking big to push the death toll over a 100 people, and so there's probably an al-Qaqaa connection here though, he says, there's probably not much point in revisiting the issue.

True enough, but wouldn't it have been nice if, at some point, we had actually visited the issue? I mean, I know we parachuted in and mixed it with the rest of the election's final week feces-throwing, but that seems to have worked to divert attention from it, not interest anyone in a full-fledged investigation. Indeed, we seem to have written it off as part of the 2004 election warfare, and once the polls closed, everyone agreed to leave it in the past. Everyone, I guess, save the insurgents.

February 21, 2005

"W" Is For Women (When Convenient)

You owe it to yourself to read Riverbend's wrenching post on what the constitutional codification of shari'a law means for Iraqi women:

“And is Iran so bad?” He finally asked. Well no, Abu Ammar, I wanted to answer, it’s not bad for *you* - you’re a man… if anything your right to several temporary marriages, a few permanent ones and the right to subdue females will increase. Why should it be so bad? Instead I was silent. It’s not a good thing to criticize Iran these days. I numbly reached for the bags he handed me, trying to rise out of that sinking feeling that overwhelmed me when the results were first made public.

It’s not about a Sunni government or a Shia government- it’s about the possibility of an Iranian-modeled Iraq. Many Shia are also appalled with the results of the elections. There’s talk of Sunnis being marginalized by the elections but that isn’t the situation. It’s not just Sunnis- it’s moderate Shia and secular people in general who have been marginalized.
...
It’s also not about covering the hair. I have many relatives and friends who wore a hijab before the war. It’s the principle. It’s having so little freedom that even your wardrobe is dictated. And wardrobe is just the tip of the iceberg. There are clerics and men who believe women shouldn’t be able to work or that they shouldn’t be allowed to do certain jobs or study in specific fields. Something that disturbed me about the election forms was that it indicated whether the voter was ‘male’ or ‘female’- why should that matter? Could it be because in Shari’a, a women’s vote or voice counts for half of that of a man? Will they implement that in the future?


It wasn't long ago that Bush was crowing about his compassion for the women of Afghanistan and running on the great changes he's made in their lives. But, like with gays, Bush's ideals never outlive their political utility. He, and his smug, hypocritical backers -- "W" is for women! -- make me ill. Where's your compassion now, assholes?

Where's your compassion now?

Continue reading ""W" Is For Women (When Convenient)" »

February 17, 2005

And Don't Tell Me Different

Will the prime minister be Jafari? Chalabi? A third candidate? I don't know, but I know who to ask:

A close aide to al-Sistani, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the alliance leaders will visit his office in Najaf to get his blessing for their choice for prime minister. If they cannot agree, al-Sistani will decide.

You know what this doesn't sound like? Iran. Nope, not in the least.

Outsourcing's Next Target

Well this is brilliant. We're outsourcing the war to incompetent soldiers from poor countries with shoddy human rights records. And, just like with regular outsourcing, the manpower is being massed through a byzantine web of contractors and subcontractors and no one can figure out what country's laws, if any, these guys fall into. In addition, our contact point was Custer Battles, the same Custer Battles that defrauded us out of $15 million by, among other shenanigans, providing security to an airport that wasn't in use. Excellent.

February 16, 2005

In For Out

This may be a blessing in disguise. The Muslim Scholars Association, a hardline, highly-influential Sunni group, has offered their participation in the government if US troops set a timetable for withdrawal. It's a demand we obviously can't meet as is, but were the Shi'as and Kurds to announce that the path was now for the Iraqis to chart and a united, clearly-autonomous Iraq was necessary for that, it'd leave us with no choice in the matter. Indeed, the best thing that could happen to us would be for the democratically-elected government to offer us a dignified withdrawal in the context of proving their autonomy, maybe pairing a timetable (for Sunni dignity) with conditions for implementation (for American dignity). We're too hardheaded to leave any other way, and the Sunnis are too defensive to join a government that we're involved in, so it may fall to the Iraqi-elect to chart a middle path between our competing egos.

That, after all, is what governments are for, right?

I should note that the MSA has other demands too, including full release of detained Sunni prisoners. That's obviously unacceptable, so long as our troops are are patrolling the streets we can't be throwing open the cells of thousands of hardened, recently-imprisoned insurgents. But beyond rejecting the request in the immediate sense, leftover prisoners pose a really tricky problem that we're eventually going to have to solve. Do we turn the insurgents over to the current government? If so, when? What if they want to let a bunch of angry, anti-American radicals out in a gesture of goodwill? It's not something we can really stop, which is why I fear we'll not allow it in the first place. If we were smart, we'd withdraw and ensure that the prisoners can only leave once we do, but we've thus far shown little evidence of being smart .

February 15, 2005

Media Imprecision

Matt's observation that the media, in discussing Iraq's future, is conflating a pro-Iranian government with an Iranian-style government misses the point, I think. The conversation isn't really about the institution of velayet-e faqih (Khomeini's philosophy that only those steeped in Islamic jursiprudence can rule) or friendly relations with their Shi'a neighbor. The commentary on Iran is being used as a heuristic for the possibility of Iraq emerging as an anti-American government. That's what they mean by Iran-style, they may as well say "hostage-crisis style". And that's also the fuzziness Matt's picking up on. The media, invested in pro-democracy spin, doesn't want to publicly legitimize the potential for democracy to achieve an anti-American result, but they do want to discuss it somehow. Iran, despite having been instrumental in the success of our invasion, is useful in conjuring up images of Western-hating theocracies. So they keep name-dropping it, sometimes in context of who Iraq's allies will be, sometimes in context of how Iraq's government will form, but always with the same end in mind.

Money Makes the World Go Round

As Justin Logan notes, Kerry's comment that we really had a "coalition of the bribed, the coerced, the bought and the extorted" turned out to be spot-on, with the newly elected Bush administration no longer even bothering to hide the payoffs:

The $80 billion war-funding request that President Bush plans to send Congress next week will include $400 million to help nations that have troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland, a staunch ally in Iraq, is earmarked to receive one-fourth of the money.
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"These funds . . . reflect the principle that an investment in a partner in freedom today will help ensure that America will stand united with stronger partners in the future," White House press secretary Scott McClellan said in a statement. "This assistance will support nations that have deployed troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other partners promoting freedom around the world."

Poland has taken command of a multinational security force in central Iraq that is made up of about 6,000 troops -- among them more than 2,400 Polish soldiers. Polish officials say that a reduction this month will leave them with about 1,700 troops in Iraq.

"Poland has been a fantastic ally because the president and the people of Poland love freedom," Bush said in announcing that Poland is earmarked to receive $100 million.

It's hard not to love that last quote by Bush, but I'm going to try and resist the urge to mock and instead say I think this is fine. Not to be too real politk about the whole thing, but America is not a charity, and there is no reason we shouldn't use our budget to convince allies over to our side. Indeed, Congress does it constantly, appropriating for this or that member's pet projects in return for their support on entirely unrelated bills. Poland is not a rich country and their support was substantial, both militarily and diplomatically, paying them off doesn't bug me. In fact, I far prefer the bribes and arm-twisting to be out in the open, where we can see it, than in circuitous, closed-door negotiations.

Now, it's certainly true that bribing our allies to go along with misguided or immoral initiatives is wrong. But it's wrong because of the initiative's merits (or lack thereof), and it's up to us not to walk down those paths and up to other countries to refuse complicity. Openly rewarding countries for making significant sacrifices to support our priorities isn't wrong or, if it is, it isn't rare. Doing it this way just makes the transaction obvious and amplifies its effect by publicizing the quid pro quo.

February 14, 2005

Ballots Counted

With the Iraqi ballots counted and the results released, things look good. Sistani's list did well, but not well enough to act like democratically-elected dictators. They'll probably need to forge good relations with the Kurds, whose second place finish is karmically positive (after the endless oppression they've undergone, they deserve some power) and politically advantageous. As a secular minority group, it's to their interest to forge alliances and demand protection for secular minority groups, which is good for Sunni-Shia relations. That Sunnis did so badly as to not even be given their own spot on the vote totals is an obviously awful indicator, and one I'll say more about in a moment. Allawi and his list came in third, which means, if nothing else, that Americans did not fix or drastically affect the election. Not that I thought we would, but a better than expected showing for Iyad and his crew would've been very dangerous in the hands of anti-American demagogues. For Iraq's new government to be considered legitimate, it needs to be totally devoid of America's taint.

For better wrap-ups than mine, I suggest Cliff May (seriously), Brad Plumer, Matthew Yglesias (and, less pessimistically, here), and Kevin Drum. On Drum's "wherefore the Sunni results" question, I have a sneaking suspicion that the Sunni's were grouped in with "other" because their vote total was so stunningly, absurdly low that releasing the numbers would make the vote look illegitimate, anger the Sunnis (though it's their fault) and undermine the "yay democracy!" spin circling through the media.

February 11, 2005

Bush Gets it Right

I know this question is becoming trite, but what the hell is Friedman talking about?

There will be a lot of trial and error in the months ahead. But this is a hugely important horizontal dialogue because if Iraqis can't forge a social contract, it would suggest that no other Arab country can - since virtually all of them are similar mixtures of tribes, ethnicities and religions. That would mean that they can be ruled only by iron-fisted kings or dictators, with all the negatives that flow from that.

Excuse me? First of all, George W. Bush has repeatedly stated that he disagrees with folks who think the brown people can't have democracies, and you are not going to question the single thing that unites us. But more to the point, if the Iraqi attempt at reform falls through, that'll mean nothing more than that they didn't succeed. Maybe the killing factor wasn't color, but American occupation and the divisions we caused. Maybe it was Saddam's legacy. Maybe it was corruption in Kurdistan. Maybe it was -- gasp! -- multicausal and not necessarily pregnant with meaning for future generations.

Stable, democratic states are weird things that no one's quite been able to blueprint. They don't always work where we think they will, they don't always fail when they should, and we're not quite sure how to move them from one column to the other. Suggesting that their success may be intrinsic to the ethnicities of the groups involved is absurd and, truly, the first time I've ever seen anyone erect the straw man Bush knocked down. Many of us mocked him when he said that, turns out we were wrong. It was a preemptive strike on Tom Friedman.

February 10, 2005

To Fight or Not to Fight?

I've not been particularly interested in the Cole/Goldberg slapfest (the only surprising thing was Cole wasting time on him, which seemed to me a defeat at the outset), but the argument over advocating war without fighting it is certainly worth engaging. Unfogged started it (read the comments too) and Yglesias picked it up, and now I'll throw my pennies into the fray.

The central point is whether young, healthy guys who advocate war are morally compelled to fight in it. The consensus is so long as we have a capable, volunteer army, no. I agree with that. If you argue for war then dodge conscription (like Rove, DeLay, Limbaugh, Bush, et al), you're fit for Republican leadership a bad person. I agree with that, too. The point Matt brings up, however, is thornier, which should be expected from a philosophy major. Assume you advocated for war when it looked like the volunteer army could take care of it, but their numbers proved inadequate. What then?

Seems a couple considerations become relevant. For instance -- how important did you think the war was? Were you a nominal supporter who believed, on balance, that this'd be better to do than not, but only if doing it wouldn't be very tough? I'd argue that that was the position of the vast majority of Americans during the buildup to the Iraq War. It'd been 30 years since we'd had a tough fight and few were thinking trenches and body bags. In order to cement that interpretation, the Bush administration set about firing any military leaders who offered contrary assessments, began promising a greeting full of candy, chocolates, and flowers, and predicting a resoundingly swift and victorious exit. So the support was soft, and guaranteed by optimistic government assessments. Pack of lies, as it turned out, but does that have moral bearing on those who believed them?

Yes and no. Yes because there was enough information to form an alternative hypothesis on the ease of the war, no because there was also a convincing counter-argument. But even if the initial morality is muddled, that doesn't change the emerging question -- if, at this point, knowing what we know, you still believe that the war is worth fighting and the troops should remain until the mission is completed, you have some degree of moral responsibility to contribute to that effort. After all, now you're supporting an conflict that is obviously not easy, self-evidently understaffed, and desperately in need of increased manpower. That doesn't always mean that you must actually fight, but it means you have to devote considerable time and resources to bolstering the war effort.

Weirdly, I think Jonah does this. Look at his picture on NRO -- this is a soft, untested man. His use in the field would be limited, at best. But through some divine joke, he's become a known and respected pundit, and his efforts in that capacity on the conflict's behalf do indeed support the effort. One of the problems in this debate is that we're equating sacrifice with usefulness. No one doubts that an Army General is deeply useful to the conflict, and also safely out of suicide bomber reach. Further, no one doubts that all these armchair generals would love to be offshore aircraft-carrier generals, outfitted in fancy uniforms and charged with drawing up strategic documents. That would make them more useful to the effort and they'd all be willing to do it, but we don't want them to have those jobs. Not only would they be bad at them, but they haven't earned them and they wouldn't suffer in them. And that, I think, is what's at issue here. If Jonah and others are going to advocate something that brings suffering, they should suffer in turn. And that's wrong. If they want to support a war with a draft, then they're compelled to fight. But if they want to support a war with a moderate manpower shortage, they're only compelled to decide where they're most useful, work from there, and be willing to accept a draft if it becomes necessary.

Sign Me Up

The Training Wheel strategy makes a lot of sense to me. Maybe somebody should appoint Justin Logan to something and let him try and implement it.

I should clarify this though and say it only makes sense in context of the constraints Bush has already placed on himself. It's self-evident that we need to set conditions of, and an expected date for, withdrawal. If the insurgent's attacks appear to be keeping us in the country, it'll sap their support among Iraqis so quick their skullcaps will spin. Thanks much to Bush, then, who has ruled this out. Let's hope he voted against it before he votes for it.

February 6, 2005

A Brave Old World

Is Iran the future of Iraq?

With religious Shiite parties poised to take power in the new constitutional assembly, leading Shiite clerics are pushing for Islam to be recognized as the guiding principle of the new constitution.
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At the very least, the clerics say, the constitution should ensure that legal measures overseeing personal matters like marriage, divorce and family inheritance fall under Shariah, or Koranic law. For example, daughters would receive half the inheritances of sons under that law.
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Shiite politicians, recognizing a possible backlash from secular leaders and the Americans, have publicly promised not to install a theocracy similar to that of Iran, or allow clerics to run the country. But the clerics of Najaf, the holiest city of Shiite Islam, have emerged as the greatest power in the new Iraq. They forced the Americans to conform to their timetable for a political process. Their standing was bolstered last Sunday by the high turnout among Shiite voters and a widespread boycott by the Sunni Arabs, and the clerics will now wield considerable behind-the-scenes influence in the writing of the constitution through their coalition built around religious parties.

It's easy to forget that Iran started out promising not to install a repressive theocracy or allowing clerics to run the country. In fact, for the first few years Ayatollah Khomeini barred clerics from senior government positions. That stood until the MEK, which was the marginalized-group-cum-insurgency, launched a particularly ferocious and sustained series of attacks. The bombings were so stunning and sweeping reprisal so expected that it was barely noticed when Khomeini, amidst the other elements of his crack down, lifted the ban and began installing clerics. And so Iran became a theocracy.

So, to distill, the ingredients there were an Islamic power base in government, a vicious insurgency, and a starting moderation that helped the Islamists achieve power but that they never wanted in the first place. Connect the dots. And get depressed.

February 1, 2005

Of Ayatollahs and Imams

Somewhere in Mother Jones's impossible to navigate archives, Brad Plumer writes:

it might not be the end of the world if democracy in the Middle East gave rise to Islamic governments, as many have feared. Eventually, these leaders have to keep the country running smoothly, and they need to answer to voters. An overly-zealous and incompetent government could well turn people away from religion altogether, or promote the development of a secular society, as we're seeing in Basra.

That's a pretty undercovered point. So long as religion is kept out of the public sphere, it gets to play in rhetorical fantasy lands and promise all sorts of utopias for the glorious day when it takes hold of the government. That, for instance, is exactly what what Ayatollah Khomeini used to fuel the Iranian revolution. Religion, which by nature is conceptually unmoored from the terrestrial realities that constrain (if only slightly) the promises of most political parties, can promise nothing short of paradise, and nothing more specific, which allows all aspects of society to project their own desires onto the moral perfection to come. Once the demagogues reach office and start restricting freedom, imposing Shari'a, and mishandling the economy, however, support drops fast. If we're dealing with a democracy that means the theocrats need to respond to popular opinion or lose power.

But that's a big if. Under democracy, it might almost be best for the Islamists to take power. Let them attempt faith-based economics in an already-ravaged economy and lose their public support. If the democracy is weak, however, popular discontent will lead the regime to oppress its people or, in the doomsday scenario, pick a scapegoat and distract their supporters by hunting down the Sunnis. Then you have civil war. So while an Islamist regime spending itself out and getting voted down would be great, it's not a chance that can be taken unless the democracy is independently strong or externally guaranteed, and I'm not sure Americans have the stomach for the latter.

January 30, 2005

Iraqi Elections

I'm with Matt on the Iraqi elections, a day that will go down in history but be forgotten the morning after. Like the June 30th handover, this is a largely symbolic event whose success -- given the constraints of Sunni non-participation -- will be forgotten by nightfall. At the moment, the streets seems blissfully clear of shrapnel and gore, and I think they'll probably remain so. The insurgents realize that, with or without attacks, tomorrow's elections will produce a government. So why expose themselves to the elevated risk promised by the day's enhanced security? They can lay low for a day, or even a few, waiting for the heads of government to shift (or, if Allawi wins, emerge codified) and the new leaders will find themselves no more protected than the old. After all, an Iraqi-led government has been "ruling" for months now, what do the insurgents care which Shi'ite is at its helm?

Americans, for our part, will spend the morning watching CNN say the same thing a thousand ways. We'll exult in the mystical power of voting, but next week, it'll be back to the news ticker's impersonal body counts. So elections? Count me in, I think they're great. But with the rebellious, terrified minority that's driving the insurgency boycotting the polls, let's not pretend that the Ballot Fairy will sprinkle constitution dust on this razed country and out of the ashes will emerge a stable, pluralistic democracy. Iraq's task is monumental, and its solutions anything but telegenic. In fact, odds are neither our military nor cable bureaus will be playing a big role in them...

Update: Well scratch my predictive powers, there was plenty of violence.

January 27, 2005

"The Red Light Means Time, Not Kill"

The Washington Post has a great article on Democracy training in Iraq. While most commentary is focused on macro issues like ethnic tensions, tribal loyalties and the whims of the insurgency, it's easy to forget about the basic glitches, like the fact that none of these candidates have ever run for office before. And it's nice to see that our election institutions, unlike the Pentagon and their soft-money problems, are playing no favorites. When the Communist party is ecstatic at the quality of American training and help, we're doing something right. And when the unnamed Hill vet/Kerry voter who's running the program returns to the states, I hope she runs for office herself. Democrats for democracy indeed...

January 26, 2005

Ding, Dong

Doug Feith has quit. Oh happy day! The prime incompetent amid a sea of pretenders, he distinguished himself as an omnipresent voice for incompetence, playing a crucial part in fucking up of the invasion, and occupation, of Iraq. To quote Suellentrop:

Of all the revelations that have surfaced about the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal so far, the least surprising is that Douglas Feith may be partly responsible. Not a single Iraq war screw-up has gone by without someone tagging Feith—who, as the Defense Department's undersecretary for policy, is the Pentagon's No. 3 civilian, after Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz—as the guy to blame. Feith, who ranks with Wolfowitz in purity of neoconservative fervor, has turned out to be Michael Dukakis in reverse: ideology without competence.

Should be getting a Presidential Medal of Freedom any day now.